

# The links between Equity, Governance, Education and Peacebuilding in Kenya



## **Exploring the Linkages between Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Kenya**

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Cover Photos: © UNICEF/Kenya2015/13 year-old girl travels to dump site daily to collect recyclable materials to supplement household income/ well-furnished school in slum areas of Kenya

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED	- Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project	COM	- UNESCO
ADEA	- Association of Development Education in Africa	KNBS	- Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics
ASALs	- Arid and Semi-Arid Lands	KNDR	- Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation
BoM	- Board of Management	KNEC	- Kenya National Examinations Council
BIA	- Bridge International Academy	KEPSHA	- Kenya Primary School Head Teachers Association
CDE	- County Director of Education	KNUT	- Kenya National Union of Teachers
CDF	- Constituency Development Fund	KUPPET	- Kenya Union of Post Primary Education Teachers
CEB	- County Education Board	KSSHA	- Kenya Secondary Schools Heads Association
CFS	- Child Friendly Schools	MoE	- Ministry of Education
DEO	- District Education Officer	MoEST	- Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
DfID	- Department for International Development (UK)	MoHEST	- Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology
DiPaD	- Daima Initiatives for Peace and Development	MoJNCCA	- Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs
ECDE	- Early childhood development education	MRC	- Mombasa Republican Council
EiE	- Education in Emergencies	MoS PAIS	- Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security
EMIS	- Education Management Information System	NACC	- National AIDS Control Council of Kenya
ESARO	- Eastern and Southern African Regional Office	NACONEK	- National Council for Nomadic Education
FGM	- Female Genital Mutilation	NCIC	- National Cohesion and Integration Commission
FPE	- Free Primary Education	NCMA	- National Conflict Mapping and Analysis
FSE	- Free Secondary Education	NER	- Net Enrolment Ratio
FTI	- Education for All Fast Track Initiative	NESP	- National Education Sector Plan
GER	- Gross Enrolment Rate	NPI	- Nairobi Peace Initiative
GoK	- Government of Kenya	NSC	- National Steering Committee
GPE	- Global Partnership for Education	NYS	- National Youth Service
GPI	- Gender Parity Index	OECD	- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
IDA	- International Development Association	PA	- Parents Association
IGAD	- The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development	PDE	- Provincial Directors of Education
ILO	- International Labour Organisation	PEP	- Peace Education Programme
INEE	- Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies	PTA	- Parents Teachers Association
IPUMS	- Integrated Public Use Microdata Series	SAGA	- Semi-Autonomous Government Agency
JCCP	- Japan Center for Conflict Prevention	SID	- Society for International Development
JKF	- Jomo Kenyatta Foundation	SCI	- Social Cohesion Index
KCPE	- Kenya Certificate of Primary Education	SCEO	- Sub-County Education Officer
KCSE	- Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education	SEPU	- School Equipment Production Unit
KEMI	- Kenya Education Management Institute	START	- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
KESSP	- Kenyan Education Sector Support Programme	TSC	- Teachers Service Commission
KICD	- Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development	TTC	- Teacher Training College
KIE	- Kenya Institute of Education	TU	- Trade Union
KIPPRA	- Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research	UNESCO	- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
KISE	- Kenya Institute for Special Education	UNICEF	- United Nations Children's Fund
KLB	- Kenya literature Bureau	UPE	- Universal Primary Education
KNAT	- Kenya National Commission for	WASH	- Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Research Context

Kenya has experienced recurrent intergroup conflicts primarily over political power and resources the nature of which have left it vulnerable to outbreaks of violence during elections. Security is also threatened by attacks from violent groups such as Al Shabaab, recruiting both externally and within Kenya's borders. Education is both affected by and has a potential role in responding to these threats through addressing historically-embedded tensions and marginalization along ethnic and religious lines and reversing uneven development across regions.

This research, involving two country case studies in Kenya and South Sudan, explores the relationship between education sector management, inequity, conflict and peacebuilding. Funded and commissioned by UNICEF's Eastern and Southern Regional Office (ESARO) as part of their global Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) programme, the research in Kenya was led by Ulster University with support from colleagues in the University of Glasgow, Universitat de Barcelona, Strathmore Governance Centre, Nairobi, and the University of Nairobi.

### Research Methods

This study has taken a mixed methods approach. Quantitative analysis draws on secondary statistical datasets to examine the dimensions of inequality (in terms of educational access, resources and outcomes). Qualitative analysis draws on a combination of policy documents, academic literature and stakeholder interviews to better understand the processes by which education can either contribute to conflict and tensions in Kenyan society or promote social cohesion and sustainable peacebuilding.

### Key findings

**Examining educational inequalities in Kenya.** The quantitative findings suggest that despite efforts to expand access to education in Kenya, enrolment rates in secondary education remain a challenge and large inequalities of access persist between regions. There is a group of counties in the north-eastern regions (i.e. Mandera, Turkana, Garissa and Wajir) that show clear indicators of poor educational development in terms of low enrolment rates, inequality of access by gender and inadequate provision of educational resources. Furthermore, some counties with high inequality of access and poor provision of educational resources are precisely the counties where there has been the highest concentration of conflict events since 2007. It is also important to highlight that educational inequalities are not only associated with conflict occurrence; counties with poor educational indicators and high occurrence of conflict are also those with high poverty rates, indicating a strong relationship between the different dimensions of development. Although it is not possible to confirm causality, this association suggests that counties with poor development indicators (including access and resources for education) may be more vulnerable to violent conflict.

Qualitative findings are based on interviews with key stakeholders in Nairobi and across four county case studies: Tana River, Kiambu, Kisumu and Nakuru. They show that education inequalities are perceived to be driven by levels of poverty and regional development, insecurity, cultural barriers and attitudes, unequal access to quality secondary education and a curriculum that fails to account for variation in learning environments.

**Redistribution.** Since inequitable provision of education can contribute to grievances among ethnically and regionally diverse groups, redistributive education policies are particularly important from a peacebuilding perspective. Government efforts to promote equity in education provision have included free education policies, a secondary school quota system that favours public primary school candidates over their private school counterparts and a teacher deployment policy through which teachers can be posted anywhere in the country. In light of current shortcomings in the quality of public primary schools, disparities in access to quality secondary education, weaknesses in capacity and monitoring, and the challenge of insecurity that restricts the mobility of students and teachers across regions, the actual impact of redistribution policies on equality is highly contested. Notwithstanding concerns over the capacity of county governments to absorb

development funds, devolution is already showing potential to bring infrastructural development to the most marginalized.

**Representation.** Education governance and administration in Kenya is undergoing significant reorganization in line with the 2010 constitutional reform. It is clear that far-reaching and unbiased civic education is needed so that all stakeholders, including communities, can participate in devolved governance and play an oversight role as anticipated in the new Constitution. Furthermore, governance issues like corruption and political patronage are perceived to hamper equitable provision of education services, weakening citizens' trust in the state and fueling grievances that can undermine social cohesion and give rise to conflict. Such practices need to be urgently addressed through enhancing checks and balances, transparency in financial management and inclusive participation in decision-making processes.

**Recognition and Reconciliation.** Interviewees perceive educational mobility of both students and teachers across regional, ethnic and religious divides as an important means of achieving integration and national unity. Democratic learning environments are also seen as important in terms of promoting trust and tolerance, while discrimination, excessive punishments and unwarranted discipline can reproduce a culture of violence and corruption. Despite being taken very seriously in Kenya since 2008, the impact of peace education on reconciliation has been limited by weaknesses in the linkage between curriculum, management and governance, including insufficient capacity development of teachers, perceptions of peace education as an emergency response and an emphasis on promoting intergroup relations over addressing systemic and structural injustices. Well-governed interventions that address the issues of high youth unemployment and disaffection along ethnic and religious lines are also important in addressing youth recruitment into violence.

### Conclusions

**The relationship between education inequalities, governance and conflict:** While no direct causal relationship can be determined, the quantitative analysis demonstrated an association between poor educational indicators and high occurrence of conflict across counties. In addition, both poor educational indicators and high incidence of conflict align with high poverty rates, suggesting a relationship between dimensions of development, educational inequalities and vulnerability to conflict. It has also been observed that marginalization of these north-eastern counties in terms of education provision has recently been exacerbated by external security threats. In some instances, educational institutions, students and staff have been directly affected by violence.

**How education governance can contribute to reducing vulnerabilities to conflict:** Devolution has been a central approach to addressing the root causes of conflict in Kenya. As a result of partial devolution in the education sector, there are now parallel systems of governance at the county level and a number of conflicts have arisen, particularly in relation to the employment and management of teachers. If handled well, devolution has the potential to address inequities and marginalisation across regional and ethnic lines, considered a root cause of conflict in Kenya. However, care is needed to ensure the country does not become even more divided along tribal lines. To circumvent this, education has an important role to play in fostering national unity among Kenya's ethnically diverse population. Notwithstanding concerns over the capacity of county governments to absorb development funds, devolution is already showing potential to bring infrastructural development to the most marginalized. Without fostering more representative governance, there is a risk that devolution may maintain rather than transform the status quo, reinforcing governance systems based on patronage and favouritism. Key findings suggest a lack of community participation; lack of oversight and accountability; and insufficient mechanisms in place to ensure budgets are not lost to corruption.

The contribution of education to social cohesion and intergroup relations: Kenyan peace education programmes and policies demonstrate a desire to promote peace and reconciliation. However, the important task may be to imbed this perspective in the education system and to ensure implementation of these policies through institutional commitment and developing capacity over a sustained period. School management and governance mechanisms that ensure students are not subjected to discrimination, excessive punishments or unwarranted discipline from an early age are imperative so that schools do not play a role in reproducing a culture of violence and corruption. It is difficult to be definitive about the



role of education in addressing threats to national security posed by violent groups such as Al Shabaab, since many of the underlying causes lie beyond Kenya's borders and are linked to geopolitical factors. However, internal historical grievances along ethnic and religious lines and perceived collective punishment of already-marginalized populations, including refugees, are thought to exacerbate these risks. Education that is better aligned to livelihoods and thus 'relevant' to local conditions may also be an important aspect of an alternative strategy to deal with youth recruitment into violence, while at the same time recognising the cultural value of local systems.

### **Recommendations**

#### ***National education policymaking and curriculum development should:***

- Reconsider the relevance of the 8-4-4 system in meeting economic and cultural needs of children and youths across diverse environments and ensure education is aligned to youth livelihoods.
- Strengthen public sector monitoring and auditing mechanisms to ensure equitable and efficient use of limited financial and teaching resources.
- Strongly enforce mechanisms to ensure that secondary school fee guidelines are respected.
- Invest in raising the standards of county and district secondary schools to a level comparable with national and extra-county schools.
- Take affirmative action so that schools in sparsely-populated regions and regions with high populations of out-of-school children can invest in facilities and infrastructure.
- Continue developing an effective Education Management Information System (EMIS) and publishing EMIS microdata at school level for researchers and users to analyze.
- School-level governance and local authorities should:
- Put in place stronger monitoring and reporting mechanisms to address violence, excessive or unwarranted discipline and prejudicial treatment of students and ensure implementation of policies against corporal punishment.
- Be sensitized to the value of education and held accountable for the implementation of government policies on issues such as early marriage and child labor.
- Receive far-reaching, unbiased civic education and opportunities to contribute to education policymaking.
- Ensure that school governance committee nominations are inclusive and transparent to address perceptions of bias.

#### ***County governments should:***

- Strengthen their capacity to prioritize, budget and use their resources effectively.
- Update and rebrand youth polytechnics to make them more attractive to students and parents.

#### ***Teacher training and management should:***

- Integrate peace education into pre-service and in-service training for all teachers in the long-term.
- Improve the transparency of teacher performance and integrity appraisal.





Photo: © UNICEF/Kenya2015/Children out-of-school in Arid Lands of Kenya



# 1. INTRODUCTION

This study explores the relationship between education sector management and governance, inequity, conflict and peacebuilding in Kenya, examining the linkages between inequities in education and broader political economy dynamics that contribute to conflict pressures. Kenya's Sessional Paper No.1 on education, training and research (2005) recognized the linkages between education, equity and peace in its philosophy. It envisaged education as a resource for social cohesion as well as for economic and human development and acknowledged the need for affirmative action to address multiple forms of new and historical inequalities.

*"Instilling values such as patriotism, equality, peace, security, honesty, humility, love, respect, tolerance, cooperation and democracy through education and training will be critical." (MoEST, 2004, p. 21)*

Home to at least 42 indigenous tribes, Kenya has an ethnically diverse population and has experienced outbreaks of intergroup conflict. Analyses of Kenya's political economy highlight historically embedded tensions across ethnic lines, of which conflicts over political power and land distribution are most prominent (Conflict Sensitive Consortium, 2010; Sundet et al., 2009). Since independence in 1963, politically-motivated violence has been a recurrent theme in Kenya. However, the violence that erupted following the 2007 elections was of an unprecedented scale, leaving over a thousand people dead and hundreds of thousands more displaced (Brown, 2013). According to Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2012 on National Cohesion and Integration, the 2008 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Agreement attributed Kenya's predisposition to conflict to a number of issues that have undermined social inclusion, national unity and trust in governance institutions:

*"constitutional, institutional and legal challenges; unresolved land issues; poverty, inequality and regional imbalances; youth unemployment; lack of consolidation of national unity; and impunity combined with a lack of transparency and accountability" (MoJNCCA, 2012, p. 2).*

Sessional Paper No. 2 also recognized that past policies for national development in Kenya focusing on growth and poverty reduction have been insufficient in terms of achieving equity and national cohesion, which are necessary for 'long term development prospects' and 'sustained nationhood' (ibid, p.1). By targeting resources to areas with better capacity to use them efficiently and poorly implementing distributive policies, some poverty and illiteracy reduction strategies were even counterproductive in terms of national cohesion and integration (ibid).

Peace and security in Kenya is also under increasing threat from al-Shabaab (and other groups in Kenya such as al-Hijra), particularly in the north-eastern region bordering Somalia and Kenya's two largest cities, Nairobi and Mombasa (Anderson and McKnight, 2015; START, 2015). Kenyan educational institutions, their students and their staff have been affected both directly and indirectly by recent acts of violence. The April 2015 attack on Garissa University, claiming 147 lives, is among the three most lethal attacks on educational targets recorded in the Global Terrorism Database, dating from 1970 (START, 2015). In November 2014, 17 teachers travelling home at the start of school holidays were among 28 passengers identified as non-Muslim and killed by al-Shabaab in a bus hijack in Mandera County (Aljazeera, 2014; Iaccino, 2015). One consequence is that teachers are fearful and refuse to take up posts in these areas, which means that children, adolescents and youths are further deprived of education in the already marginalized north-eastern counties.

Of further concern is the increasingly 'home grown' aspect of the threat, with reports of 'Swahili-speaking Kenyans' among the perpetrators of these recent attacks (Anderson and McKnight, 2015, pp. 547–549). Regarding the recruitment of Kenyans into violent groups, evidence suggests that socio-economic and political exclusion may be more important than cultural or religious factors. Internal societal divisions, disaffection among populations who have been historically marginalized in terms of social services, and lack of employment opportunities are seen as risk factors (ibid; see also Ploch, 2010).

This research seeks to understand how and in what ways education sector management and governance and the education system itself is a contributing or mitigating factor in the conflict and how better education sector management and governance might contribute to peacebuilding to support sustainable peace and

development. While the role of education is often marginalized in both peace-making and peacebuilding processes (Novelli and Smith, 2011), there is growing evidence that educational inequity can be a catalyst to conflict and should therefore be taken more seriously. Specifically, recently-completed research convincingly demonstrates that the statistical probability of violent conflict occurring is about 2.5 times greater in contexts where educational inequities exist (FHI360, 2015).

It is well-established that education, as a key social service, can both promote and undermine peace (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2004; Smith, 2005), and that access to quality education is seen both a basic human right and a means to fulfilling other rights (Sen, 1999). While education can be a powerful driver of economic growth and social mobility (Shultz, 1961; Becker 1964), it can also be a powerful driver of social stratification and thus reproduce societal inequities that undermine social cohesion and reconciliation and increase the likelihood of conflict outbreak (Smith, 2005). For these reasons, the key issue at stake is not merely how much resources are spent on education – although this is important – but where, on what and with what effects? While many studies have explored the relationship between education and conflict, few have attempted to explore how education sector management and governance contribute to the reproduction of societal inequities that may fuel cleavages and thus contribute to violent conflict.

This research thus seeks to ask questions about the coordination and management of the education sector – its policies and priorities, funding, implementation and effects. In an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, this study also recognizes that research on the management and governance of education cannot begin and end within the borders of the nation state but must also explore the complex roles of regional and global actors in shaping national educational agendas.

This mixed method research, combining quantitative statistical analysis of available education data with qualitative interviews and focus group discussions among key constituencies, builds on these insights by exploring Education Sector Management and Governance and its relationship to Inequity, Conflict and Peacebuilding in two country case studies: Kenya and South Sudan.

The research was funded and commissioned by UNICEF ESARO. Field research in South Sudan was led by Sussex University, supported by the University of Juba. Field research in Kenya was led by Ulster University, with support from the University of Nairobi and the Strathmore Centre for Governance, Nairobi.

## 1.1 Concepts and definitions

The research explores the relationship between education sector management and governance, inequity, conflict and peacebuilding in the country case studies of Kenya and South Sudan. A number of key conceptual tools are central to this research, including the inter-connected concepts of governance, equity and inequality, social cohesion, and peacebuilding. This section of the report lays out working definitions of some of the key research concepts.

### **Governance**

Governance refers to the sum of all concurrent forms of collective regulation of social issues. This ranges from the institutionalized self-regulation of civil society through the diverse forms of cooperation among state and private actors to the action of sovereign state agents (Mayntz, 2003: 66). Aragon and Vegas (2009) highlight two distinctive aspects of definitions of governance. The first concerns political control of a system and the context this creates, with governance defined in terms of the policy-making process (e.g. how the rules of a political regime provide the context for policy-making). The second aspect refers more to technical capacity and the ability to implement policies and deliver and manage services (Smith, 2010, 2014). This research concerns both of these aspects – the politics and process of education sector governance.

There is also a third aspect of governance, which is more analytical and considers ‘governance’ as a concept of our time, reflecting a shift from government to governance, and, for some, towards ‘global governance’ (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). This involves a shift from the idea of the government as the unitary source of educational governance (that funds, provides, regulates, and owns the education system) towards a more ‘coordinating’ and facilitating role involving a range of actors operating at multiple geographical scales. This



can be traced to the shift from Keynesian to neoliberal political economy approaches that have dominated international development debates since the 1980s (Robertson et al., 2006). Dale (2005) sees this as the scalar and functional division of education governance, which necessitates exploration of the supra-national or international, national, and sub-national levels. It also requires exploration of governance activities – funding, provision, regulation, and ownership, and the actors and institutions (state, market, community, and household) responsible for carrying them out. Analysis of educational governance reflects on who is doing what, where, with what outcomes, and for whom. This requires sensitivity towards the multi-scalar and functional division of these processes in contemporary contexts. This research adopts a broad view of the education sector, considering both formal and non-formal (alternative) education at primary and secondary levels.

### **Equity and Inequity in Education**

Horizontal inequities have been identified as important indicators for conflict outbreak (Cederman et al., 2011; Stewart, 2010). For UNICEF, equity is a guiding principle and implies

*“that all children have an opportunity to survive, develop and reach their full potential without discrimination, bias or favouritism [...] regardless of gender, race, religious beliefs, income, physical attributes, geographical location or other status” (UNICEF, 2011).*

UNICEF's equity-focused approach to development

*“addresses the economic and social barriers that prevent access to services, focusing on the most vulnerable sectors and thus contributing to a fairer distribution of resources and benefits. It helps to level the playing field” (2012b: 8).*

In this sense, education policies and programmes aim to address root causes of inequality, to ensure the fundamental rights of all children, particularly those experiencing deprivation, including access to basic protections and services necessary for survival and development. Within discussions of equity and inequality, there are tensions over the principle of equality of opportunity and provision, versus targeted redress of unequal social location. For example, while a version of equity might be achieved by ensuring that all schools receive the same funding (based on pupil numbers), for others, this would be seen as inequitable precisely because some schools are located in more socially deprived locations and face more difficult challenges than others and should therefore be prioritized. Reflecting UNICEF's view of equity, Bourdieu (2008: 36) notes that,

*To favor the most favored and disfavor the most disfavored, all that is necessary and sufficient is for the school to ignore in the content and teaching it transmits, in the methods and techniques of transmission and the criteria of judgement it deploys, the cultural inequalities that divide children from different social classes. In other words, by treating all students, however much they differ, as equal in rights and duties, the educational system actually gives its sanction to the initial inequality.*

In seeking equity in education, the targeted distribution of resources might therefore be necessary to redress historical inequalities. This has been the underlying argument for policy measures such as affirmative action and positive discrimination. Analysis of equity in education thus needs to be grounded in the contextual analysis of the country, existing socio-economic, cultural, political, and religious inequalities, and the resources, policies, and practices aimed at addressing them. While economic dimensions of inequalities, or redistribution, are important, there are also other dimensions of inequality that require attention. Recognition refers to the ways in which culturally-related and identity-based issues manifest themselves, while representation concerns a sense of isolation from decision-making spheres. As outlined by Nancy Fraser (1995, 2005), these reflect the ways in which different dimensions of inequity and inequality manifest themselves and highlight the need for a holistic strategy to redress them.

In this report the term ‘inequality’ is used when referring to measuring or analyzing differences between individuals and social groups and the term “inequity” is used when making normative judgements about the implications of these inequalities for social justice. Therefore, while ‘equity’ is used throughout the text, ‘inequality’ is used in some parts of the quantitative analysis and when discussing data.

## **Social Cohesion**

Social cohesion, like many key development concepts, is contested and open to a variety of interpretations (see Jenson, 2010). The Council of Europe defines social cohesion as “the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding polarization. A cohesive society is a mutually-supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means.” This definition captures two key aspects of many definitions: ‘inequalities’ and ‘social relations and ties’ (Berger-Schmitt, 2002: 404-5). The UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) captures the social and structural dimensions of social cohesion, defining it as

*“the quality of coexistence between the multiple groups that operate within a society [...] along the dimensions<sup>1</sup> of mutual respect and trust, shared values and social participation, life satisfaction and happiness as well as structural equity and social justice” (UNICEF, 2014).*

Social cohesion is a societal rather than individual property based on the promotion of positive relationships, trust, solidarity, inclusion, collectivity, and common purpose. Social cohesion refers not only to individual or communal attitudes and relations (horizontal dimensions), but also involves structural aspects of governance (vertical dimensions) that affect connections between communities or civil society and the state (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Friedkin, 2004). Social cohesion is linked to social justice and equity. Higher income inequality has been associated with lower social cohesion, and more equitable societies tend to have greater social and political trust and less violence and crime (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010). Educational equality has been linked with greater social cohesion across a number of measures, with educational inequality positively correlated with violent crime and political unrest and negatively correlated with political and civil liberties (Green et al., 2006). Improving social cohesion requires addressing structural, inter-personal, and inter-group domains. In this sense, social cohesion can sometimes be used interchangeably with the concept of peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts, as a kind of synonym for the aspirational production of a society with strong social inclusion, social capital, and social mobility (see OECD, 2012). In the UNICEF PBEA programme, social cohesion has been used in several contexts as a proxy for peacebuilding, due to local sensitivities related to peace or peacebuilding language in some of the countries in which the PBEA operates, such as Ethiopia.

## **Peacebuilding**

While this study recognizes that there are multiple interpretations of the term ‘peacebuilding’, the framework herein draws on a conceptualization that focuses on the need for core transformations for post-conflict societies to move towards sustainable peace. Key post-conflict transformations necessary to produce sustainable peace, or positive peace, as Galtung (1976) calls it, require going beyond the mere cessation of violence (negative peace) to address the root causes of violent conflict. This involves addressing both drivers and legacies of conflict and the promotion of social justice and cohesion by addressing injustices and bringing people and communities together. This is in line with a range of contemporary theories of war and conflict (Stewart et al., 2005, 2010; Cramer, 2005), which see horizontal and vertical inequalities as drivers of conflict. Addressing these inequalities in their different economic, cultural and political dimensions supports the promotion of social cohesion whereby trust, solidarity, and a sense of collectivity and common purpose are strengthened. Such an approach is also highly relevant in fragile contexts where the risks of conflict are significant.

This research also refers to the concept of ‘conflict sensitivity’ in discussing peacebuilding approaches in the education sector. Drawing on UNICEF PBEA definitions (UNICEF ESARO, 2015), ‘conflict sensitivity’ involves explicitly addressing factors contributing to violent conflict and mitigating the spread of conflict, as well as supporting conflict-affected communities in dealing with trauma and protecting vulnerable children and adolescents. However, conflict sensitivity has often been associated with humanitarian (‘emergency’) responses, which may limit analysis of the connections between education sector governance or management and the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of broader conflict and peacebuilding processes.

<sup>1</sup> Structural dimensions refer to institutional and political structures and patterns of societal relations and distribution of power and resources.

## ***The Relationship between Education management and governance, Inequity, Conflict and Peacebuilding***

Within conflict studies, there has been a long and heated debate on the relationship between inequality and conflict. The debate is often framed in terms of greed versus grievance, which suggests that wars are driven less by justified ‘grievances’ and more by personal and collective ‘greed’ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Humans are viewed as ‘economic agents’ making cost-benefit calculations and trying to maximize returns on engagement in violent conflict. Therefore, the route to peace and security is not through addressing inequality and structural exclusion, but through increasing the cost of access to resources for violent actors. While ‘greed’ may play a role in shaping, exacerbating, and reproducing conflict, a strong critique of this work argues that horizontal inequalities (between groups) are important indicators for conflict outbreak (Stewart, 2010), arguments supported by strong econometric evidence (Cederman et al., 2011). Horizontal inequalities, often related to ethnicity, tribe, or religion, involve a range of dimensions, as outlined in Table 1.

Table 1: Dimensions of horizontal inequality

Economic dimensions	Access resources, assets, employment (e.g. government, private), and income
Political dimensions	Access to political power and representation at all levels (e.g. government, local authorities, armed forces)
Social dimensions	Access to public services (e.g. education, health, housing, water)
Cultural dimensions	Recognition and respect for difference and identity (e.g. ethnicity, religion, language)

Source: Stewart, 2010

In armed conflicts, real or perceived horizontal inequalities or injustice can provide a catalyst for group mobilization and uprisings. While a significant body of research has examined the role of education in conflict, there is limited research on the relationship between education and inequality and the manner in which it gives rise to violent conflict. Recent quantitative research drawing on two international education and conflict datasets (FHI 360, 2015) demonstrates a robust and consistent relationship, across five decades, between higher inequality in educational attainment between ethnic and religious groups, and the likelihood that a country will experience violent conflict. However, this research is less able to identify causal mechanisms (i.e. how inequities are perpetuated or reproduced via education sector management and service delivery). Therefore, as the authors note in their conclusions, there is a need to explore multiple dimensions of inequality beyond just educational outcomes, as well as the different ways in which the education system might contribute to or alleviate conflict. In this sense, the current research begins where this previous study ends, delving deeper into the broad nature of inequalities in education, the management of education and its relationship to governance, including the allocation of resources and development of policies, and the possible ways that education systems might address these inequalities and political economies that drive violent conflict.

This research distinguishes between concepts of ‘inequality’ and ‘inequity’. ‘Inequality’ is used to refer to measurement or analysis of differences between individuals and social groups, while ‘inequity’ is used in examining the implications of these inequalities for social justice. The term ‘inequality’ is used in quantitative data analyses, while ‘inequity’ is used when discussing structural or systemic factors shaping and perpetuating inequalities.

## 1.2 The 4Rs Theoretical and Analytical Framework

The framework used in the study builds on some of the above concepts and thought, developing an analytical and normative approach that seeks to capture the multiple economic, cultural, political, and social dimensions of inequality in education and the ways in which these might relate to conflict and peace (see Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, & Smith, 2015). The framework combines four dimensions of recognition, redistribution, representation, and reconciliation, linking Fraser’s (1995, 2005) work on social justice with

the peacebuilding and reconciliation work of Galtung (1976), Lederach (1995, 1997), and others, to explore what sustainable peace and development might look like in post-conflict environments. This approach has many parallels with UNICEF's equity approach (see Epstein, 2010), which emphasizes inclusion, relevance and participation, concepts which overlap with redistribution, recognition and representation respectively, whilst adding reconciliation, which is vital in conflict-affected contexts.

The examination of inequalities within the education system seeks to capture the interconnected dimensions of these '4Rs':

- Redistribution concerns equity and non-discrimination in education access, resources, and outcomes for different groups in society, particularly marginalized and disadvantaged groups (thus addressing the 'access' dimensions of equity).
- Recognition concerns respect for and affirmation of diversity and identities in education structures, processes, and content, in terms of gender, language, politics, religion, ethnicity, culture, and ability (thus addressing the 'cultural' dimensions of equity).
- Representation concerns participation in governance and decision-making related to the allocation, use, and distribution of human and material resources at all levels of the education system, thus addressing the 'political' dimensions of equity.
- Reconciliation involves dealing with past events, injustices, and material and psychosocial effects of conflict, as well as developing relationships trust.

The framework provides a useful tool for analyzing the extent to which education can support cross-sectorial programming for conflict transformation in terms of redistribution, recognition, representation, and reconciliation. It can also be used as an analytical tool within the education sector, as outlined in Table 2.

Table 2: Working within the education sector: analyzing education systems using the 4Rs

Analyzing education systems using the 4Rs: Potential 'indicators'	
Redistribution (addressing inequities)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vertical and horizontal inequalities in education inputs, resources, and outcomes (quantitative data)</li> <li>• Distributive effects of macro education reforms or policies (e.g. impact of decentralization and privatization on different groups and conflict dynamics)</li> </ul>
Recognition (respecting difference, addressing cultural equity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policies on language of instruction</li> <li>• Recognition of cultural diversity and religious identity in curriculum</li> <li>• Citizenship and civic education as a means of state-building</li> <li>• 'Relevance' of curriculum to diverse communities and local livelihoods</li> <li>• Addressing violence</li> </ul>
Representation (encouraging participation, addressing political equity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participation (local, national, global) in education policy and reforms</li> <li>• Political control and representation through education administration</li> <li>• School-based management and decision-making (teachers, parents, students)</li> <li>• Support for fundamental freedoms in the education system</li> </ul>
Reconciliation (dealing with injustices)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Addressing historical and contemporary injustices linked to conflict</li> <li>• Integration and segregation in education systems (e.g. common institutions)</li> <li>• Teaching about the past and its relevance to the present and future</li> <li>• Vertical trust in schools and education system, and horizontal trust between identity-based groups</li> </ul>



### 1.3 Research questions and hypothesis

This research is guided by three primary questions: 1) To what extent is educational management generating equity or inequities in education in Kenya? 2) In what ways is, or might, the governance of education contribute to 'sustainable peace and development' in Kenya? 3) How do inequities perpetuated and/or produced via education reflect broader dynamics of political economy that contribute to violent conflict in Kenya? Following from these guiding questions, a number of sub-questions were identified:

- What are the dimensions and main drivers of educational inequity in the country?
- How do these inequities relate to recognized drivers of conflict in the country?
- How do key decision-makers (global, national, local) see the relationship between educational inequity and violent conflict, and seek to address educational inequities?
- What are the effects of key educational reforms (e.g. decentralization, privatization) and policies on educational inequities and sustainable peace and development?
- What types of educational governance reforms might contribute to addressing educational inequities and to 'inclusive' state-building and sustainable peace and development?

This research is based on the hypothesis that inequities perpetuated and produced through the governance of the education system can contribute to pressures for conflict, reflecting broader political and economic dynamics. Addressing inequities in education management and delivery can thus support peacebuilding as well as broader political economy reform.

### 1.4 Structure of the report

This research report explores how the governance of education in Kenya is addressing or aggravating inequity in its multiple dimensions (the 4Rs) and therefore promoting or undermining social cohesion and sustainable peace and development. Chapter 2 provides an outline of the research methods employed in this study. Chapter 3 gives a brief background to the structure and governance of the education system in Kenya. Chapter 4 presents the quantitative data analysis. This is followed by an analysis of inequalities, social cohesion and conflict focused on the four counties visited for qualitative data collection in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses some important factors that are perceived to perpetuate inequity in education in Kenya, concentrating on qualitative interview data, and considers to what extent policy responses are promoting redistribution. Chapter 7 examines education sector management and governance in terms of the capacity and opportunity for all stakeholders to participate and influence (representation). Chapter 8 considers the effect of education sector governance and management on social cohesion in Kenya from the perspective of promoting recognition and reconciliation. The final chapter draws some conclusions on the relationship between education management and governance, inequity and supporting sustainable peace and development through education in Kenya and provides recommendations.

## 2. RESEARCH METHODS

This study takes a mixed methods approach to understanding the relationship between education, inequity, conflict and peacebuilding in Kenya. The qualitative analysis draws on a combination of policy documents, reports, academic literature and primary interview data, while the quantitative analysis draws on secondary statistical datasets.

### 2.1 Desk review

The research began with a desk study in October 2014 from which a background report was compiled. The review of relevant academic literature, policy documents, reports and conflict analyses provided a better understanding of conflict dynamics in Kenya and was used as a basis for the development of the research methodology and empirical data collection. The report provided a preliminary overview of the structure and financing of the education system, as well as inequities in the education system. This early work also served to identify major developments in the Kenyan education system since independence in 1963, as well as peacebuilding efforts in Kenya. The integration of peacebuilding approaches into education policy, and vice versa, was investigated by examining references to peacebuilding in national education policies since 2005 and, correspondingly, education references in peacebuilding, conflict management and national cohesion strategies.

The initial report concluded that when considering the extent to which education is 'conflict sensitive' six key aspects of education are important. These are:

- addressing inequities reproduced by education
- macro education reforms (e.g. decentralization, privatization)
- integration and social cohesion (e.g. language policies, segregation in education)
- teacher policies and practice
- youth policies and programs
- policies for refugees and IDPS

In late November 2014, the principal researchers from the University of Sussex and Ulster University made a preliminary visit to Nairobi to validate these conclusions. The researchers engaged with representatives from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST), UNICEF, DfID, the Kenyan Institute of Curriculum Development (KICD), National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), the University of Nairobi and Strathmore Governance Centre in one-on-one or small group discussions.

### 2.2 Quantitative analysis of secondary statistical data

The quantitative analysis provides information on the nature of and trends in educational inequities at the national and subnational level (former provinces and counties) in Kenya between 2009 and 2014. The analysis was performed on statistical microdata from a number of existing sources containing information on conflict events, education and socioeconomic contextual conditions.

For educational data on access, resources and outcomes, the study relied on the Education Management Information System (EMIS) for Kenya. EMIS data, based mainly on 2014 school census data, was extracted on 12 October 2015 from the 2014 Basic Education Statistical Booklet, which was published by MoEST and UNICEF Kenya Country Office. MoEST and the UNICEF Country Office informed the research team that EMIS

data for the period between 2008 and 2013 was not accessible, so this study relied mainly on the educational data published in the statistical booklet. Data on students' performance in national examinations at the end of primary education (KCPE) was obtained from the website Kenya Open Data <https://opendata.go.ke/>.

For population and socioeconomic contextual data, this study uses the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census and the population projections of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). Census data was extracted on 12 January 2015 from the IPUMS international project website of the Minnesota Population Center <https://international.ipums.org/international/>. IPUMS-International is an effort to inventory, preserve, harmonize, and disseminate census microdata from around the world. It contains the world's largest archive of publicly-available census samples.

GINI coefficients were taken from the KNBS and Society for International Development (SID) National Inequality Report, 'Exploring Kenya's Inequality: Pulling Apart or Pooling Together?' (2013). To show differences across Kenya's counties KNBS and SID combined 2009 census data and 2006 integrated household budget survey data to compute poverty and inequality indicators. GINI is a classic indicator used to measure inequality. This measure has a minimum of 0, indicating perfect equality, and a maximum of 1, which means total inequality between the individuals or groups analyzed.

Social Cohesion Index (SCI) indicators were extracted from the National Cohesion and Integration Commission's Social Cohesion Report, The Status of Social Cohesion in Kenya (NCIC, 2013). SCI is a composite measure, involving six dimensions: prosperity, equity, trust, peace, diversity and identity. Principal component analysis was employed in order to reduce the number of manifest variables used to measure cohesion.

One source of conflict data was accessed for this study: the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED - designed for disaggregated conflict analysis and crisis mapping - codes dates and locations of reported political violence events in over 60 developing countries. Political violence includes events that occur within civil wars and periods of instability. Version 5 of ACLED data was extracted from <http://www.acleddata.com/data/> on May 14th, 2015. This study presents conflict data for the most recent period available for Kenya (1997-2014) at the national and subnational levels. The cartographic information used for the maps was extracted from the website <http://mapeastafrica.com/> on October 1st, 2015.

## 2.3 Qualitative data collection and analysis

Fieldwork in Kenya took place from January to April 2015. In Nairobi, national and international stakeholders including representatives from MoEST, the Teachers Service Commission (TSC), curriculum development, teacher unions, donors and international agencies were interviewed. These interviews were guided by a number of questions related to the management and governance of education, equity, conflict and peacebuilding initiatives. The questions also addressed issues that had been identified under the six themes listed above, e.g. the role of devolution (the form of decentralization adopted in Kenya), the curriculum, and peace education. One-on-one interviews and small group discussions (usually of two to three participants) were also carried out at the county level. For this purpose, four counties at different proximities from the central government and with varied socio-economic and cultural contexts were chosen. These four counties, Tana River, Kiambu, Kisumu and Nakuru will be described in Chapter 4. Interviewees across the four counties included county government officials, MoEST and TSC field officers, head-teachers, teachers, members of school management boards and constituency development fund committees, and, to a lesser extent, parents and youths. In all, the interview data comprises 88 one-on-one or small group interviews. To fill the gap in terms of parent and youth interviewees, focus groups of 15 and 14 participants respectively were also held towards the end of the field work. A student-teacher focus group of eight practicing teachers from various schools, pursuing further studies at the University of Nairobi was also held.

Where the interviewees consented, interviews were audio recorded, otherwise handwritten notes were taken. Organization of the interview data was aided by the use of NVivo qualitative analysis software. To hasten the transcription process, a smaller number of interviews were first selected for full transcription of audio recordings or interview notes. These interviews were then coded thematically to extract and organize recurrent and important issues. A summary of the coded thematic nodes as well as the number and type of

interviewees included in this initial analysis can be found in Annex 1. Acknowledging time constraints, these themes were used as guidelines to sort through remaining interview notes more efficiently to identify only relevant sections of the interviews. These were then transcribed as necessary.

## 2.4 Validation of findings

In February 2015, midway in fieldwork, the research team held a stakeholder meeting in Nairobi to share some initial premises and seek feedback from key stakeholders regarding the management and governance of education. Representatives from MoEST, UNICEF, USAID, the University of Nairobi and KICD participated in the forum. In November 2015, a final draft of the report was circulated to the UNICEF Country Office, Regional Office and Headquarters, as well as to a reference group of approximately twenty stakeholders for feedback and comments.

## 2.5 Research partnerships

In addition to the crucial support received from UNICEF's Kenya Country Office and MoEST, fieldwork for this study was made possible through collaboration with local researchers from Strathmore Governance Center (Utawala Africa) and the University of Nairobi. The field researcher from Ulster University was invited to work alongside the Utawala team in Nairobi, gaining from their local knowledge and expertise on governance issues. The Center's research staff also assisted in collecting interview data at the county level, as well as organizing and facilitating focus group discussions. The fieldwork especially benefitted from the support of three local researchers who are based in Tana River, Kiambu and Kisumu counties, and are thus familiar with the county governance structures and conversant in local languages. This study also benefitted from research support, feedback, and guidance from an education economist based at the University of Nairobi.





Photo: © UNICEF/Kenya2015/Education for displaced children, Kakuma, Kenya

## 3 BACKGROUND: GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN EDUCATION

This chapter provides a brief background to the current structure and organization of education in Kenya, highlighting key actors at each level of governance.

### 3.1 Centralized and decentralized national government structures

#### ***MoEST and the TSC***

Since the 2013 elections, MoEST has been headed by the Cabinet Secretary for Education. Now, there are three State Departments in the Ministry: Basic Education; Vocational and Technical Training; and University (Higher) Education, which are further divided into directorates responsible for various aspects of education (see Annex 2). Since the reform of administrative units from provinces and districts to counties in line with the Constitution of Kenya 2010, County Directors of Education (CDEs) and Sub-County Education Officers (SCEOs) are key national government officers implementing government policy at the county level – essentially exercised delegated authorities from the central government. They carry out the same functions as previous Provincial Directors of Education (PDEs) and District Education Officers (DEOs), except those previously delegated to them by the Teacher Service Commission. The TSC was given independence under the new constitution and has concurrently deployed its own field officers to the counties with a mandate limited to human resource management (Kilonzo, 2012)(Kilonzo, 2012). Both the TSC and the MoEST have mandates in relation to teachers. While MoEST is responsible for training teachers, the TSC is responsible for teacher management, including registration, recruitment and employment, deployment, promotion, transfer, discipline, dismissal and reviewing standards (Teachers Service Commission website, accessed 15/07/15).

#### ***National and County Education Boards***

The Basic Education Act of 2013 established the National Education Board to advise the Cabinet Secretary and education-related departments on matters of policy and publish an annual report on “the state of education and service delivery in the country” (Republic of Kenya, 2013). The Basic Education Act also established 47 County Education Boards (CEBs) as its agents. These boards, which have coordination, monitoring, collaboration, data management and annual reporting functions at the county level, are made up of a chairperson and 12 other members appointed by the Cabinet Secretary. The Act requires that appointees to a CEB have at least secondary- level education, and that the composition of the Board is representative of several specified constituencies, see Annex 2 (Republic of Kenya, 2013).

### 3.2 County (devolved) government structures

Despite the election of 47 county governments in 2013, education remains largely a national responsibility (MoE and MoHEST, 2012, p. 7). Table 3 outlines the education-related functions of the national and county governments. While MoEST still has responsibility for primary, secondary and university education at the national level, the county governments now have responsibility for providing early childhood development education (ECDE) and managing village polytechnics.



Table 3: Education functions, national and county governments under devolution

National government functions	County government Functions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Education policy, standards, curricula, examinations</li> <li>• Granting of university charters</li> <li>• Universities, tertiary educational institutions and other institutions of research and higher learning</li> <li>• Primary schools</li> <li>• Special education</li> <li>• Secondary schools</li> <li>• Special education institutions</li> <li>• Promotion of sports and sports education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pre-primary education</li> <li>• Village polytechnics</li> <li>• Home craft centers</li> <li>• Childcare facilities</li> </ul>

Source: Transition Authority, 2013, pp.86-87, 89.

## 3.3 School-level governance structures and teacher associations

### ***Boards of Management and Parents Associations***

Every public institution in Kenya is required to have both a Board of Management (BoM) and a Parents Association (PA) as set out in the Basic Education Act (2013, 55). The Act requires that the composition and election of these boards should be such that parents and the local community, the CEB, teaching staff, school sponsors, community special interest groups, persons with special needs and the student's council are all represented. The school head is secretary to the BoM. Unlike in the case of the CEB, the minimum qualifications of BoM members are not set out, but qualifications for each type of institution are to be prescribed in regulations by the Cabinet Secretary. CDEs have a role in advising the CEBs on the selection and appointment of both BoMs (known as School Management Committees in primary schools) and PTAs (Kilonzo, 2012). According to a board member interviewed, BoMs are in charge of managing how the resources of the institution are used. They also have an oversight role in the school, ensuring that the tendering procedure is fair for example, and that school development is sanctioned by the BoM.

### ***Head Teacher Associations and Teacher Unions***

Teachers and head teachers refer to two mechanisms through which they can channel their issues and concerns to education policymakers. Firstly, head teacher associations, Kenyan Primary School Head Teachers Association (KEPSHA) and Kenya Secondary School Heads Association (KSSHA), allow school principals to have a voice at the national level. Secondly, there are trade unions, Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) and Kenya Union of Post Primary Education Teachers (KUPPET), working nation-wide for the interests of Kenyan teachers. TUs are major stakeholders in the implementation of education policy. KNUT, Kenya's biggest teacher union, has been in existence since 1957 and has a membership of about 200,000 teachers. It participates in policymaking and law-making in the education sector and engages directly with MoEST and the TSC (Interviewee, Nairobi).

## 3.3 International presence in Kenyan education

According to a MoEST representative, approximately 2 per cent of the national education budget is provided by international partners and 98 per cent by the government through its own revenues. Thus, it was claimed that the public education sector in Kenya is relatively independent of foreign influence and the emphasis is on partnership with donors. Estimates from 2010/11 suggest that donor revenue and appropriations in aid in the form of loans and grants only make up a small share of MoE (subsector of the MoEST) actual expenditure sources – approximately 5 per cent (Republic of Kenya, 2012, p. 57). In the most recent National

Education Sector Plan, annual donor spending is said to be around US\$375 million – the equivalent to 10 per cent of government education spending. However, since 2009/10 all development partner funding has been provided ‘off-budget’ (MoEST, 2014a, p. 120).

Although there appears to be relatively low dependence on external financing for education, Kenyan education policy is by no means free from donor support and influence. For instance, research by Colclough and Webb, (2012) suggests that the 2005-2010 Kenyan Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP) was developed with strong influence from the donor community, including technical support from the World Bank. In keeping with the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda commitments on alignment, donors could not impose their own terms on the government. However, even though international and Kenyan agendas for universal primary education (UPE) coincided, donor preferences were perhaps disproportionately reflected in KESSP and are thought to have influenced the prioritization of primary education over other sub-sectors:

*“As regards alignment, the major objectives of donors were generally externally formulated, and program financing in education proved possible because the NARC government’s avowed objective of achieving FPE was consistent with MDG priorities. However, in designing the KESSP investment programme, donor preferences for the primary sector influenced Kenyan objectives and were instrumental in other parts of the education sector receiving less attention than they deserved.” (Colclough and Webb, 2012)*

While the Government of Kenya provided the majority of KESSP expenditures (94 per cent from 2005 to 2008), KESSP was also financed by a number of external partners. Over the 2005 to 2009 period, US\$121 million from the Education for All FastTrack Initiative (FTI) Catalytic Fund was disbursed to Kenya, with the World Bank as supervising agent (Thomson et al., 2010, pp. 31–32). Kenya has been an FTI (now known as the Global Partnership for Education), partner since 2005 and FTI contributed the largest share (2.2 per cent) of donor support to KESSP (GPE, accessed 15/07/15; Thomson et al., 2010, p. 25, Table E7). The next-largest external contributions came from DfID (1.3 per cent) and the World Bank International Development Association (IDA, 1 per cent). In 2014 Kenya received a further grant of US\$88.4 million from GPE in line with their new National Education Sector Plan (NESP), which the World Bank is again scheduled to supervise (GPE, accessed 15/07/15; MoEST, 2015a). Data on aggregate donor disbursements to education in Kenya between 2005 and 2013, based on the OECD Creditor Reporting System, suggests that the UK and Germany contribute the highest share of bilateral education ODA and that the World Bank IDA also has a strong financial presence (see Annex 3).

In addition, the UN has a visible presence in the education sector, and Nairobi acts as the East Africa regional hub for many of its agencies. UNICEF and UNESCO work in close partnership with MoEST. For instance, both agencies supported the development of the Kenyan Government’s 2014 Policy for Peace Education, (MoEST, 2014b). UNHCR, in partnership with MoEST, UNICEF, NGOs and other partners, plays an important role in providing education to refugees.





Photo: © UNICEF/Kenya2015/Primary school, Turkana County



## 4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The quantitative analysis of education inequities aims to complement the qualitative analysis of educational inequities presented in the same report. This chapter provides and analyses information on the nature and trends in educational inequities at the national and subnational-level (former provinces and counties) in Kenya for the period between 2009 and 2014. The first section of the chapter presents our approach to the measure of equity in education and describes the indicators used in the chapter. This is followed by three sections that analyze educational inequities of access, resources and outcomes by former provinces and counties in Kenya for 2014, the latest year available. The last section of the chapter outlines recent historical trends of conflict data in the country and tests the hypothesis of an association between higher educational inequities (access, resources and outcomes) and conflict occurrence at the subnational level in Kenya.

### 4.1 Measuring equity in education

The main aims of the quantitative analysis of educational inequities have been to describe the nature and trends of educational inequities at the subnational level in Kenya, and to explore the association between the existence of regional educational inequities and the occurrence of conflict for the period under study. Inequity between groups, also known as horizontal inequality, draws along socioeconomic and identity lines such as class, religion, ethnicity and gender. These horizontal inequalities are important because, as several studies have shown, groups faced with multiple forms of inequality are most likely to resort to conflict, and the coincidence of different dimensions of social inequality may lead to political discontent, instability and violent conflict. This study measures the level of educational inequities between regions in Kenya as an indicator of the amount of educational inequities between groups in the country. Territorial inequalities are particularly relevant for the field of conflict studies. Inequalities between regions overlap with other sources of inequality (i.e. ethnicity, social class, wealth, gender) and are quite often the result of the different opportunities available to individuals in these territories (inequality of opportunity), as well as of the discrimination and biases toward some territories by central governments (inequality of treatment).

In order to capture the different dimensions of educational inequities, this report distinguishes between inequities of access, resources and outcomes. Inequities in access to secondary education are usually the consequence of unequal patterns of demand for education, and the unavailability of 'inputs' (that organizations such as UNICEF refer to as 'supply-side' barriers), which would include, for example, teachers or secondary schools in a particular territory. This study examines three different indicators of inequity of access to education: gross enrolment ratios (GER), net enrolment ratios (NER) and the gender parity index. Both GER and NER show the general level of participation in a given level of education. However, while GER takes into account the total number of pupils of all ages in a particular grade level in school measured against the entire 'appropriate school-going' age for that grade level, NER only takes into account students of the 'appropriate school-age' for the corresponding grade level. The gender parity index is an indicator designed to measure the relative access of males and females to education. It is expressed as a ratio of girls to boys, with 1 representing perfect equality and values lower than 1 indicating lower participation of girls.

Inequitable allocation and distribution of resources does not receive great attention in well-established education systems but can be an important source of inequity and grievance in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Schools with inadequate provision of teachers, books or infrastructure will have more difficulty offering fulfilling educational experiences and effective opportunities for learning to their students. Several studies have analyzed the allocation of educational funds between regions, but indicators of student teacher ratios or school infrastructure are better proxies to measure if these resources have actually reached schools in a particular territory. In this study, we consider student-teacher ratio in primary and secondary education as the main indicator of inequity of resources. Student-teacher ratios measure the level of human resources (teachers) available to students. A higher ratio indicates that students have lower access to teachers, which is an indicator of inequitable distribution of teachers among regions.

Inequity of outcomes refers to the unequal capability of students in different contexts to make the most of the educational opportunities available to them. Unequal outcomes are usually the combined effect

of inequities in the quantity, quality and relevance of educational provision. All education systems aim to guarantee a basic level of educational outcomes to the whole student population. Student scores in standardized assessments would be good indicators of educational outcomes, but this data is rare in developing countries. Although typically referred to as 'efficiency indicators', alternative indicators of outcomes are the percentage of repeaters, promotion and dropout rates. However, these indicators are not always reliable and are difficult to interpret due to problems with data reporting by schools and the effect of cohort size on the value of the indicator. Because of this, this study combines two different indicators to measure the level of educational outcomes in Kenya: the percentage of repeaters in primary education and students' scores in the national evaluation at the end of primary education. The percentage of repeaters in primary education and their test scores at the end of primary education must be interpreted as a measure of the real opportunities available to students to succeed in their educational trajectories.

The following sections present the analysis of the three dimensions of educational inequalities: access, resources and outcomes. Each section shows data on national trends and inequities between former provinces and counties. Since the promulgation of the new Constitution in 2010, Kenya is organized into counties rather than provinces. The study thus presents educational inequities for both former provinces and counties. This is because of the similarities among counties from the same province and because it is easier to analyze and understand graphs that contain a small number of cases (eight former provinces) than those that contain a large number of cases (47 counties). Therefore, inequities among former provinces will be presented in graphs, and inequities among counties will only be presented in maps. We conclude with a final section that shows territorial coverage of conflict and explores the level of association between the occurrence of conflict and educational development indicators at the subnational level.

## 4.2 Inequity of access

Inequity in access to education, particularly in secondary education, is one of the challenges Kenya still faces today. Table 4 shows how access rates to education are associated with economic and social development and the occurrence of conflict at the international level. In the case of Kenya, there is higher access to primary and secondary education and higher levels of gender equality than international averages for fragile and conflict-affected countries. Although the level of access to primary education in Kenya is similar to the international average for middle-income countries, access to secondary education is much lower in Kenya than in these countries. In 2014, only 47.4 per cent of students of the corresponding age (9-12) were enrolled in secondary education in Kenya, and for every 10 boys in secondary school there were nine girls.

Table 4: International comparison of access to education by type of country (2014)

	PRIMARY EDUCATION		SECONDARY EDUCATION	
	Net enrolment ratio	NER Gender Parity	Net enrolment ratio	NER Gender Parity
World	89	0.98	66	0.96
High Income	95.5	1	89.9	1.02
Middle Income	89.7	0.99	66.8	0.96
Low Income	79.9	0.94	31.6	0.83
Fragile & Conflict-Affected	74.9	0.91	36.9	0.81
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>88.2</b>	<b>0.96</b>	<b>47.4</b>	<b>0.91</b>

Source: World Bank & EMIS

National trends in access to education in Kenya have significantly improved in recent years. Data from Table 5 shows a marked expansion in access to secondary education and a slight reduction in gender inequality in access to primary and secondary education. The total number of students in secondary education increased by 58.3 per cent in five years, with a growth of 63.3 per cent among female students. The net enrolment rate in secondary education is still under 50 per cent but has grown by 14.3 points during the period under study. The gender parity index - ratio of girls to boys - rose by 5 points. There was no significant improvement in net enrolment in primary education and gross enrolment decreased by 4.2 per cent. The reduction in gross enrolment in primary education should be attributed to a reduction in age-grade distortion and grade

repetition, or, put more simply, improved quality and performance of the education system.


Table 5: National trends in enrolment ('000) by gender. Kenya, (2009-14)

	PRIMARY EDUCATION			SECONDARY EDUCATION		
	2009	2014	Change % (2009-14)	2009	2014	Change % (2009-14)
Number of students	9,183.5	9,950.7	8.4	1,472.6	2,331.7	58.3
Students male	4,722.8	5,052.4	7.0	787.9	1,213.3	54.0
Students female	4,460.7	4,898.4	9.8	684.7	1,118.4	63.3
Gender parity index	0.94	0.97	0.03	0.87	0.92	0.05
GER	107.7	103.5	-4.2	41.9	58.7	16.8
NER	87.5	88.2	0.7	33.1	47.4	14.3

Source: EMIS

While improvements are clearly observable, the previous table shows that unequal access to secondary education remains a challenge in Kenya. Figure 1 compares access to secondary education among former Kenyan provinces. The data indicates a high level of inequity in access to secondary education across populations living in the different regions. In former Central and Eastern Provinces, secondary school gross enrolment rates exceed 80 per cent and net enrolment rates exceed 70 per cent, while in Nairobi and North Eastern Province enrolment rates are less than 30 per cent. It is important to say that in the regions with the highest enrolment rates (Central and Eastern Provinces) the difference between net and gross enrolment rates is quite large (>15 per cent), indicating a significant proportion of over-age school populations in these regions.

Figure 1: NER and GER in secondary education by former province, Kenya, 2014




Source: EMIS

Figure 2 presents the gender parity index in former provinces; it shows high levels of gender equality in access to primary and secondary education in most of the regions. In the majority of the regions, there are

no less than eight girls for every 10 boys; in the case of the central region there are more girls than boys enrolled in secondary education ( $>1.0$ ). The only exception to this pattern is North Eastern Province where gender inequality in access is large. Here, there are only four girls for every 10 boys enrolled at both the primary and secondary levels.


Figure 2: Gender parity (NER) in access to secondary education by former province, Kenya, 2014



Source: EMIS

One of the advantages of the EMIS database is that it allows for analysis of educational inequities at the county level. The map below offers a more nuanced picture of inequities in access to secondary education between territories. Counties with a darker color indicate higher net enrolment rates in secondary education than counties with a lighter color. Map 1 shows that counties with higher enrolment rates in secondary education are located in Central, Western and Nyanza regions. There are seven counties in Kenya with net enrolment rates above 80 per cent; these are Vihiga, Kisii, Makueni, Nyeri, Kirinyaga, Tharaka-Nithi and Murang'a. On the other hand, the counties with the lowest access to secondary education are located in the northern regions. There are three counties with net enrolment rates below 10 per cent; these are Mandera, Turkana and Wajir.

Map 1: Net enrolment ratios in secondary education by county. Kenya, 2014




Source: EMIS

In addition to information on inequities in access between counties, Map 2 shows inequities in access to secondary education within counties. Counties with a darker color indicate higher equality of access to secondary education between boys and girls. As seen earlier for the enrolment ratios, patterns of gender inequality in access at the county level fit neatly with former provincial divisions. However, there are also significant differences between counties within the same region. One would expect that those counties with the highest enrolment in secondary education would be precisely those counties with the highest gender



equality in access, but this is not always the case. There are four counties where enrolment rates for girls are much higher than for boys ( $>1.10$ ); these are Tharaka-Nithi, Meru, Nyandarua and Kirinyaga. Some of these counties also showed high net enrolment ratios (Map 1). However, in the case of Meru, enrolment rates in secondary education are lower than 60 per cent. On the other hand, in some counties, girls have much lower access to secondary schools than boys. In the case of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Turkana Counties, there are less than five girls for every 10 boys in school. Counties with the highest inequality in access by gender are also those with the lowest net enrolment rates.

Map 2: Gender parity (NER) in access to secondary education by county, Kenya, 2014



Source: EMIS

## 4.3 Inequity of resources

Inequity in resource allocation and distribution between regions is an issue of great importance for education policy and planning in countries facing challenges. This can be particularly true in terms of school infrastructure and deployment of teachers. Table 6 outlines national trends in the number of schools in primary and secondary education and the percentage of schools by type of school (public/private). The number of primary and secondary schools in Kenya has significantly increased in the last five years. The number of schools in primary education increased by 28.5 per cent during this period, a process of expansion that was led by the private sector, reducing the percentage of primary schools that are public by 7.2 points. Given that school size tends to be larger in the public sector than in the private sector, this reduction in the percentage of primary schools that are public is not necessarily analogous to a reduction in the percentage of students attending public primary schools. While there has been significant expansion in the number of secondary schools (48.4 per cent), it is necessary to remember that during this period, there was also a marked increase in the number of students in secondary education (58.3 per cent). EMIS data available for this period in Kenya does not allow for analysis of trends in student-teacher-ratios, which would have been very interesting in order to assess how the expansion of access in secondary education has impacted on student learning conditions at this level.


Table 6: National trends in the number of schools, Kenya, 2009-14

	PRIMARY EDUCATION			SECONDARY EDUCATION		
	2009	2014	Change % (2009-14)	2009	2014	Change % (2009-14)
Number of Schools	22,920	29,460	28.5	5,884	8,734	48.4
Number of public schools	18,543	21,718	17.1	5,019	7,686	53.1
Public school %	80.9	73.7	-7.2	85.3	88.0	2.7
Number of private schools	4,377	7,742	76.9	865	1,048	21.2
Private school %	19.1	26.3	7.2	14.7	12	-2.7

Source: EMIS

The comparison of inequity of resources among regions is very relevant in political terms because it can be seen as an indicator of the capacity of central and regional governments to respond to the needs of students in the different territories. Figure 3 presents student-teacher ratios in primary and secondary education by former provinces of Kenya during 2014. Student-teacher ratios are higher in primary than in secondary education in all regions, as can be expected given the different characteristics of these levels of education. However, in some regions, student-teacher ratios in primary education are extremely high, doubling the ratios found in secondary education. This is the case for North Eastern and Western Provinces, with 45 and 40 students per teacher respectively. Student-teacher ratios in secondary education are very similar across regions, with an average of 20 students per teacher. The only exception to this pattern is Nairobi, where student-teacher ratios (16.9) are significantly lower than the rest of the country.


Figure 3: Student teacher ratios in primary and secondary education by former province, Kenya, 2014




Source: EMIS

Maps 3 and 4 allow us to compare student-teacher ratios in primary and secondary education across counties. Map 3 presents student-teacher ratios for primary education and Map 4 does the same for secondary education. The county with the highest number of students per teacher in secondary education is Turkana (28) and the counties with the lowest ratios are Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit and Kajiado – all of them with less than 17 students per teacher in secondary education. In primary education, the counties with the lowest student teacher ratios are Tharaka-Nithi, Baringo, Nyeri and Embu – all of them with less than 24 students per teacher. Some of these counties also have high net enrolment rates in secondary education. On the other hand, there are some counties with more than 45 students per teacher in primary schools; these are Wajir, Garissa, Mandera and Turkana. When you compare inequities of access and resources at the county level, it seems very clear that counties with wider access to secondary education are precisely those with better provision of resources and better learning conditions in school at the primary school level. The opposite is also true for counties with low access to secondary education. These tend to be the counties where students get a much poorer allocation of resources and learning conditions at the primary level.

Map 3: Student-teacher ratios by county, Kenya, 2014



Map 4: Student-teacher ratios by county, Kenya, 2014



Source: EMIS

## 4.4 Inequity of educational outcomes


Although access to good data is not always available, inequity of outcomes is one of the areas of major concern for education planners and practitioners. EMIS data is far from optimal for measuring educational outcomes, a result of the data collection and reporting methods applied. However, there are some indicators that can capture the level of inequity in educational outcomes among regions to a certain extent. This study presents data on the percentage of repeaters in primary education and on students' English and mathematics' scores in national examinations at the end of primary education (KCPE).

Repetition is strongly associated with poor learning outcomes and school dropout. Students who do not repeat classes in primary education have higher chances of completing their primary education studies and



transitioning to secondary education, which is one of the most important educational outcomes in a country like Kenya. Figure 4 presents data on the percentage of repeaters in primary education and in Grade 4 by former provinces in Kenya. The regions with the highest levels of repetition are Western, Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces. The regions with the lowest levels of repetition are Nairobi and North Eastern. These results are very counterintuitive because they show a very different picture from enrolment figures in secondary education by region. One would expect that those regions with lower repetition rates in primary education would also be the regions with the highest gross and net enrolment rates in secondary education. However, in the case of EMIS data for Kenya it is just the opposite. One possible explanation for this discrepancy might be that enrolment rates are biased due to poor population projections. However, we have seen in the previous section that enrolment rates and gender parity indices are quite reliable indicators in EMIS 2014 data. The other possible explanation for this discrepancy is that repetition rates are biased due to how schools reported this information. Repetition data is collected through surveys completed by teachers who need to recall the number of students that repeated in their group. Data collected through this method might be biased due to poor reporting by teachers.


Figure 4: Percentage of repeaters in primary education by former province, Kenya, 2014



Source: EMIS

Map 5 plots repetition data for primary education at the county level. The counties with the lowest percentage of repeaters are Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Kiambu, Wajir and Mandera - all with less of 2 per cent of students repeating at the primary school level. On the other hand, the counties with highest repetition rates are Baringo and Bomet, both with more than 8 per cent of repeaters at the primary school level. As we saw in the repetition data at provincial level, there is no apparent association between repetition rates and other indicators of access and resources at the county level. It seems clear that the percentage of repeaters is not an adequate indicator for measuring learning outcomes in EMIS data. In addition, the level of repetition in all the counties is quite low, which is consistent with national policies aimed at eliminating repetition in primary education.

Map 5: Percentage of repeaters in primary education by county, Kenya, 2014




Source: EMIS

The Kenyan National Examinations Council (KNEC) collects systematic records of students' learning outcomes in primary and secondary education through national examinations. Figure 5 outlines data on students' performance in English and mathematics at the end of primary education (KCPE). Students' average scores vary across regions indicating unequal opportunities to achieve good outcomes among students in the different territories. Average scores in English vary more across former provinces (45.3<58.5) than average scores in mathematics (45.3<51.1). The region with the highest average scores in English is

Nairobi (58.5), followed by Central (50.8), Western (49.2) and Rift Valley (49.2) provinces. A similar pattern is observed in mathematics, with the highest scores being observed in Nairobi and Rift Valley (both with 51.1), and the lowest scores observed in Coast (45.3) and North Eastern (47.4) Provinces.


Figure 5: Average results in national examinations in primary education by former province, Kenya, 2011



Source: KCPE

Map 6 shows that average scores in KCPE vary not only across former provinces but also across counties within the same region. The counties with the highest average scores in primary education national examinations are quite spread out across the different regions. The counties with the highest average performance are: Garissa (North Eastern), Mombasa (Coast), Kirinyaga (Central), Kajiado (Rift Valley), Makueni (Eastern), Elgeyo-Marakwet (Rift Valley), Uasin Gishu (Rift Valley), Nandi (Rift Valley) and Busia (Western). On the other hand, the county with the lowest scores in KCPE is Tana River (Coast). As shown in the previous graph, Coast is the region with the lowest scores in KCPE. Province-level results are consistent with what is seen in the Coast region at the county level, where - with the exception of Mombasa - all the counties perform very poorly in national examinations at the end of primary education.

Map 6: Average scores in national examinations in primary education by county, Kenya, 2011



Source: KCPE


## 4.5 Conflict and educational inequities

In Kenya's recent history, there have been two key periods of high conflict occurrence. ACLED data offers historical trends of conflict occurrence by different types of conflicts. Figure 6 presents ACLED data for Kenya year-by-year from 1997 to 2014. The first important episode of conflict within this period erupted



around the presidential elections of December 2007 and lasted until the end of February 2008. During these two years, there were more than 100 episodes of 'battles', 'violence against civilians' and 'riots/protests' per year. These episodes were followed by a period of low conflict activity of three years. A new period of high conflict occurrence began in 2012 and has continued in the following years.


Figure 6: Occurrence of conflict by type of event, Kenya, 1997-2014




Source: ACLED

The geography of conflict in Kenya during the period 2007-2008 was quite different from the period beginning in 2012. Maps 7 and 8 present data on conflict occurrence for these two historical periods at the county level. During the first period, the highest occurrence of conflict was located in the Nairobi area and in Nakuru County (Rift Valley). Conflict activity was also observed in some other counties of Rift Valley, Western region and the border with Somalia. After 2012, conflict activity in the Nairobi area continued, but the epicenter of conflict moved to the east of the country, mainly to the regions bordering Somalia. The counties most affected by conflict during the last three years have been Mandera, Garissa and Isolo.

Map 7 & Map 8: Comparison of occurrence of conflict by county, Kenya





Source: ACLED

Here, the analysis focuses on the relationship between the occurrence of conflict after 2007 and educational inequities in access, resources and outcomes among Kenyan regions. Territories that have been more affected by conflict are expected to present worse indicators of educational development, as well as lower scores on social cohesion, than those affected by conflict to a lesser extent. Table 7 summarizes educational, socioeconomic and conflict data for former provinces in Kenya. In order to facilitate the comparison of indicators across columns, higher values of the different indicators are presented in the table with longer horizontal bars. The regions with the highest incidence of conflict after 2007 are Nairobi, Rift Valley, North

Eastern and Coast provinces. These are precisely the regions with the lowest enrolment rates in secondary education and the highest gender inequality in access to secondary education. It seems clear that there is a strong association between the occurrence of conflict and inequity in access to secondary education at province level in Kenya. In the case of educational resources certain regions, such as North Eastern and Coast Provinces, are highly affected by conflict. These are the regions that suffer from low deployment of teachers and high student-teacher ratios in primary education. Contrary to what happens with educational access, and to a lesser extent with educational resources, educational outcomes do not seem to be directly associated with the occurrence of conflict across Kenyan regions. This lack of association is probably due to the fact that indicators of educational outcomes in EMIS 2014 are not as robust as other educational indicators in this dataset (i.e. access). At the province level, no direct association is observed between the Social Cohesion Index and conflict data at the province level. The only region with a high occurrence of conflict and low social cohesion is the former North Eastern province. The same occurs with the Gini index, where the Coast Province is the most inequitable region and one of the most violent for the period 2007-14.

Table 7: Occurrence of conflict, socioeconomic and educational inequities by former province, Kenya


		Access		Resources		Outcomes			
	Conflicts events 2007-14	NER, secondary (%)	Gender parity index, secondary	Student teacher ratio, primary	Student teacher ratio, secondary	Mean Kcpe	Repeaters, primary (%)	SCI	Gini
Central	220	82.41	1.07	26.34	19.75	49.31	2.92	63.05	0.36
Coast	449	32.51	0.88	35.46	19.27	47.24	4.75	57.46	0.50
Eastern	215	71.33	1.04	27.85	19.70	48.44	6.01	53.14	0.38
Nairobi	490	25.30	0.84	28.69	17.09	53.24	0.77	63.70	0.34
North Eastern	351	9.78	0.39	49.55	20.13	50.89	1.41	33.37	0.36
Nyanza	207	64.55	0.89	31.73	20.16	47.83	4.58	60.39	0.42
Rift Valley	728	47.70	0.94	31.60	19.60	49.94	5.84	55.58	0.35
Western	179	55.74	0.92	40.35	20.39	50.08	6.62	53.41	0.42

Source: EMIS & ACLED

The regions with the highest occurrence of conflict are precisely those with lower enrolment rates, more unequal access to education by gender, and more students per teacher. Figure 7 explores the relationship between indicators of conflict, access, resources, outcomes and socioeconomic context at county level. The scatterplot matrix is a rapid way to evaluate the level of correlation between multiple variables. The variables are presented in a diagonal line from top left to bottom right. Each variable is then plotted against the rest of the variables. In Figure 7, each point represents one of the 47 counties in the country. The correlation matrix in Table 9 complements the data plotted in Figure 12. Higher values of the coefficients indicate higher correlation, with the asterisks showing the level of significance of the correlation. The highest correlation occurs between the two indicators of access, suggesting a strong relationship at county level between net enrolment in secondary education and inequities of access between boys and girls (.78). Less pronounced but still quite significant is the correlation between student teacher ratios in primary education and access to secondary education, indicating that the counties with more deficient allocation of teachers are those with lower access to secondary education (-.62) and higher inequity of access between boys and girls (-.71). Conflict occurrence is negatively associated to net enrolment ratios in secondary education (-.38) and, to a lesser extent, is also negatively associated to gender parity of access (-.28). Measures of correlation between conflict occurrence and educational resources are quite low. In the case of educational outcomes, it seems that the counties with higher occurrence of conflict present better educational outcomes. However, as explained in the previous sections, educational outcomes data for Kenya is difficult to interpret due to its lack of consistency when compared to other educational indicators. Contrary to the province level, at county level, the Social Cohesion Index shows a significant correlation with net enrolment ratios (.49), gender parity of access (.57) and student teacher ratios (-.49). Conflict occurrence and social cohesion are significantly associated to inequity of access to secondary education at the county level, indicating that educational inequity is an important factor in understanding the occurrence of conflict and the level of social cohesion in Kenyan territories.



Figure 7: Scatterplot matrices of conflict, socioeconomic and education inequities by county, Kenya, 2014



Source: EMIS, ACLED, KCPE, SCI & KIPPRA

Table 9: Correlation matrix of conflict occurrence, socioeconomic and educational inequities at county level, Kenya

	Conflicts events 2007-14	NER, secondary (%)	Gender parity index, secondary	Student teacher ratio, primary	Student teacher ratio, secondary	Mean Kcpe	Repeaters, primary (%)	SCI
NER, secondary (%)	-0.3759 ***							
Gender parity index, secondary	-0.2802 *	0.7767 ***						
Student teacher ratio, primary	0.1884	-0.6194 ***	-0.7088 ***					
Student teacher ratio, secondary	-0.0951	0.0272	-0.129	0.6118 ***				
Mean Kcpe	0.2848 *	0.0178	0.0971	-0.0357	-0.2916 **			
Repeaters, primary (%)	-0.5162 ***	0.0105	0.2141	-0.0951	-0.0419	-0.0787		
SCI	0.0234	0.4696 ***	0.5914 ***	-0.4878 ***	-0.1559	0.042	0.1164	
Gini	-0.1246	-0.0702	-0.0221	-0.0791	0.009	-0.5033 ***	0.0633	-0.0214

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Chapter Summary

In sum, the quantitative analysis of educational inequities provides some insights on the current situation of education and conflict at the subnational level in Kenya.

Firstly, despite efforts to expand access to education in Kenya, enrolment rates in secondary education remain a challenge and large inequities of access persist between regions.

Secondly, there is a group of counties in the north-eastern regions (i.e. Mandera, Turkana, Garissa and Wajir) that show clear indicators of poor educational development in terms of enrolment rates, gender inequality of access and provision of adequate educational resources.

Thirdly, some of the counties with larger inequities of access and poor provision of educational resources are precisely the counties where there has been the highest concentration of conflict events since 2007. It is also important to mention that educational inequities are not only associated with conflict occurrence, counties with lower and more inequitable access to secondary education are also those with lower levels of social cohesion, indicating a strong relationship between the different dimensions of development. Education planning and educational interventions should take into account these regional educational inequities if they want to combine the expansion of the education system with the aims of a fairer and more cohesive society.

Finally, it is necessary to stress the importance of collecting, systematizing and publishing educational data such as the EMIS database used in this study. National and international agencies have made great efforts to generate education statistics, but these efforts will not pay off if the data is not properly analyzed and mobilized for more effective and evidence-based policymaking. One important step in this direction would be to publish EMIS 2014 microdata at the school level for researchers and users to analyze. In December 2015, MOEST held a workshop to share the draft EMIS roadmap with its partners, signaling continued commitment to enhancing the system.






Photo: © UNICEF/Kenya2015/Girl fetching water in Garrisa



## 5. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS WITH A FOCUS ON FOUR COUNTIES

This chapter builds on the quantitative findings in Chapter 4 by providing a more qualitative analysis of education inequities, social cohesion and conflict in Kenya, with a focus on the four counties chosen for county-level data collection. These counties are Tana River, Kiambu, Kisumu and Nakuru, each located within a different former province of Kenya (Figure 8). The counties were chosen to take into account differences in terms of socio-economic and cultural contexts across Kenya, as well as to cover some of those areas prone to ethnic clashes and election violence.

Figure 8: Administrative Map of Kenya (four research sites circled in red)



Source: Map by WFP/VAM, Kenya. Note: Red lines added by the authors to identify case study counties.

## 5.1 Poverty and income inequality

Figure 9 (below) reproduces the KNBS and SID National Inequality Report (2013) illustration of the headcount index across Kenya, based on the percentage of people with consumption expenditures (a proxy for income) below the poverty line. Tana River is among the counties with the highest levels of poverty, with 75.6 per cent of individuals living below the poverty line. Furthermore, Tana River is ranked number 1 in terms of the highest poverty gap, implying that it would require the greatest amount of investment to bring everyone above the poverty line. On the other hand, Kiambu has the second lowest headcount index (24.2 per cent) after Nairobi, and the third smallest poverty gap. Nakuru also falls in the bottom ten counties in terms of headcount ratio (33.5 per cent) and poverty gap (KNBS and SID, 2013, pp. 37–39). The headcount index in Kisumu is also below the national average (39.9 per cent), as is the poverty gap (*ibid*, p. 56).

Poverty levels, poverty gaps and Gini coefficients at the national level, within rural and urban populations, and in the four counties are shown in Table 8. You will recall from Chapter 2 that a higher Gini coefficient indicates a higher level of income inequality. Based on the Gini coefficient, at 0.617, Tana River County has the highest income inequality, not only of the four counties shown in Table 6 but of all the counties in Kenya. On the other hand, at 0.335, Kiambu is among the ten most equal counties in terms of income. Nakuru (0.376) has a Gini coefficient close to the median county (Kericho 0.378), while Kisumu's Gini coefficient (0.430) is significantly higher than the median county. Inequality indicated by the Gini coefficient within urban areas (0.368) is slightly higher than within rural areas (0.378). However, it can also be seen from Table 8 that both poverty levels and the poverty gap in rural areas are higher than in urban areas. Furthermore, inequality across the entire population of Kenya (0.445) is higher than either inequality in rural populations (0.361) or inequality in urban populations (0.368) considered separately (see Table 8). This implies that there are higher disparities between rural and urban populations than there are within each group (*ibid*, pp. 43–44, 65–67).

Considering only inequality measures within regions, counties or populations when targeting conflict-sensitive education policies may therefore lead to shortcomings in assessing inequality. It is also necessary to consider the relative poverty levels of counties to other counties. To illustrate, while Turkana, Wajir, Mandera have high poverty levels (Figure 9), they are actually among the most equal counties (see Annex 4) implying that most of the population is poor relative to other parts of the country but not to each other. However, Tana River is shown to have both high levels of poverty and high levels of income inequality. From the data in Table 8, Tana River is both poorer than the other counties in this study and has higher income inequality, followed by Kisumu (indicated by lighter/unshaded cells). Kiambu and Nakuru, the two more central counties at closer proximity to Nairobi and located within the former Central and Rift Valley Provinces, experience lower poverty rates and less inequality (indicated by darker cells).



Figure 9: Poverty Levels across Kenya's 47 counties




Table 8: Selected poverty and inequality indicators across the four counties

	Poverty Level (Headcount Index*)	Poverty Gap**	Income Inequality (Gini coefficient***)
National	45.2%	12.2%	0.445
Median County	47.9% (Laikipia)	10.5% (Laikipia)	0.378 (Kericho)
Urban	33.5%	8.1%	0.368
Rural	50.5%	14.1%	0.361
Tana River	75.6%	46.1%	0.617
Kisumu	39.9%	9%	0.430
Nakuru	33.5%	6.1%	0.376
Kiambu	24.2%	5.9%	0.335

Source: (KNBS and SID, 2013)

\* Headcount Index implies % of individuals living below the poverty line.

\*\* Poverty gap (as % poverty line) implies investment it would require to bring everyone above the poverty line.

\*\*\* Higher Gini coefficient implies higher income inequality.

## 5.2 Inequalities in education

The KNBS and SID inequalities report shows that over half of Kenya's population (52 per cent) is educated to primary level and another 22.8 per cent has secondary-level education or more. The other quarter (25.2 per cent) has no education. As shown in Table 9, education levels are lower in some regions than in others as well as for rural populations and female headed households. For example, counties with the highest proportion of secondary education and above are found in central and western regions, while those with the lowest proportions are found in the country's northern and eastern regions. In Turkana, Wajir and Mandera, this is less than 5 per cent, while in Nairobi it is 50.8 per cent (KNBS and SID, 2013, p. 70). Kiambu County has the second-highest proportion with at least secondary education, and only 12 per cent of its population has no education. Conversely, Tana River falls in the bottom ten counties both in terms of secondary education and primary education levels with over half of its population (56.2 per cent) receiving no education. Both Kisumu and Nakuru have over 80 per cent of their population with at least primary education and over a quarter with at least secondary education. Nakuru is in the top ten counties as far as the proportion of people with at least secondary education is concerned (ibid, 2013, p. 72 and Table 2).

Table 9: Education levels of selected populations

Percentage of population with:	No education	Primary education	Secondary education +
National	25.2	52	22.8
Rural	29.5	54.7	15.9
Urban	15.8	46.2	38
Male-headed	23.5	51.8	24.7
Female-headed	26.8	52.2	21
Kiambu	12	48	39.9
Nakuru	17.3	54.9	27.9
Kisumu	17.7	56.9	25.4
Tana River	56.2	37.1	6.7

Source: Data selected from Chapter 5, KNBS and SID, 2013. Note 2009 census data has been used in that report.

## Regional inequities in education

Table 10 presents the education indicators used in earlier analysis (Chapter 4) disaggregated to county level. While only data for the four focus counties is presented here, education data for all counties can be found in Annex 5. It can be seen from Table 10 that of the four counties studied, Tana River performs the most poorly across all education indicators (unshaded cells indicate poorest performance) with the exception of primary education repetition for which it has the second-highest number of repeaters. In particular, Tana River's mean KCPE score of 41.32 is the lowest across all the 47 counties. In contrast, Kiambu performs almost consistently as the best among the four counties across all the education indicators (darker shaded cells indicate better performance).

Table 10: Education indicators disaggregated by county (2014)

COUNTY	NER (Primary)	Pupil-teacher ratio (Primary)	KCPE Mean skills*	Repeaters (Primary)	NER (Secondary)	Pupil- teacher ratio (Secondary)
Kiambu	96.9%	26.21%	50.18	1.44	77.60%	19.27
Kisumu	94.9%	32.15%	50.10	5.40	58.10%	19.12
Nakuru	99.0%	33.62%	48.62	2.56	59.50%	19.96
Tana River	62.6%	35.99%	41.32	4.87	16.50%	21.26

Data Source: (MoEST 2015b)

\*Mean across English and mathematics scores

Data from the case study counties is consistent with the conclusion in Chapter 4, i.e. regions and counties with poor educational indicators are also those with high poverty and income inequality. It is also consistent with previous literature that describes enduring ethno-regional inequities in educational developments (Alwy and Schech, 2004; Nyatuka and Bota, 2014; Oino and Kioli, 2014). Educational disadvantages remain most prominent in the North Eastern and Coast Provinces. Most interviewees identified the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) and the north and north-eastern regions of Kenya as those most in need of attention in order to promote equity in education in Kenya. Several also pointed to 'pockets of poverty' within more prosperous regions, such as urban slums. For instance, despite its strategic location on Lake Victoria and the resource base this provides, Kisumu City (the only city in the four counties) has high levels of poverty; in 2006 around 60% of its population was living in slums (UN-Habitat, 2006, p. 4). With adult prevalence estimated at 18.7% in 2012, Kisumu County also has the second highest prevalence of HIV in Kenya (NACC, 2014, p. 6), a further challenge to educational equity.

The NESP commits to ensuring that marginalized groups, including nomadic communities, learners with disabilities or special needs, and those living in informal settlements are no longer discriminated against. This is to be achieved through targeted grants as well as reviewing the Nomadic Education Policy Framework developed in 2009. The National Council for Nomadic Education (NACONEK) is also to be operationalized (MoEST, 2014a, p. 89). In a speech delivered at the inauguration of the selection panel for the National Council for Nomadic Education (NACONEK), former Cabinet Secretary for Education Science and Technology Jacob Kaimenyi drew attention to Kenya's constitutional obligation to ensure that minorities and marginalized groups "are provided special opportunities in educational and economic fields" through affirmative action (Kaimenyi, 2014a; Republic of Kenya, 2010, p. 38). In terms of giving attention to disadvantaged regions, interviewees agree that the government is making concerted efforts. For example, to promote equity in secondary school selection, children with lower grades from ASAL areas are also given a chance to attend national schools through affirmative action. However, many suggest that more needs to be done.

Perspectives are split as to how the Cabinet Secretary's recent abolition of school ranking relates to equity in education. Ranking of schools is not only seen as unfair, claiming you cannot compare where facilities and learning environments are vastly different, "some are learning under a tree" (MoEST field officer), but it is also thought to exacerbate the focus on examination performance to the detriment of improving competencies. However, many of the teachers interviewed lament this change, claiming that ranking if not misused can promote healthy competition. In this case, schools could be ranked within categories (e.g. mixed, boys, girls), taking account of the fact that "we are never equal" and in some regions grade

cut-offs might be lowered (Teacher, Kisumu). While ranking is an indicator of the inequitable distribution of resources, abolishing it has been termed as a superficial approach to resolving the problem. Some interviewees suggested that, rather than accepting and admitting that all schools are not equally equipped, the government needs to address the problem and ensure that public schools become equipped to the same level as private schools.

## **Gender parity in education**

Progress has been made in terms of promoting girl's education in Kenya, especially at the primary level. Although full equality for girls has not been achieved, the GPI (girls/boys) index at the primary level in Kenya has improved from 0.94 in 2009 to 0.97 in 2014, and the GPI at the secondary level has improved from 0.87 in 2009 to 0.92 in 2014 (MoEST 2015b, p. 7). However, in some communities, girl-child education is still a big challenge. For example, Table 11 shows that Gender Parity at the secondary level in Tana River is far below that in the other three counties visited. Map 2 (Chapter 3) shows that secondary school GPI in Tana River is similar to counties in north Rift Valley and former North Eastern province, which are also ASAL regions of Kenya. This data supports interviewee perceptions that in ASAL areas, education is not perceived to be as valuable as it is elsewhere, and that gender parity is still low among pastoralists and nomadic populations. According to interviewees, early marriage, early pregnancy and harmful cultural practices such as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), hinder female education and it difficult to target girls in the effort to promote equity in education.

Table 11: Gender Parity disaggregated by county, 2014

	Primary			Secondary		
County	NER female	NER male	GPI (NER)	NER female	NER male	GPI (NER)
Kiambu	98.2%	95.7%	1.03	79.5%	75.6%	1.05
Kisumu	96.7%	93.2%	1.04	58.5%	57.7%	1.01
Nakuru	98.4%	99.6%	0.99	58.5%	60.5%	0.97
Tana River	61.2%	64.0%	0.96	11.9%	21.0%	0.57
Kenya	86.4%	90.0%	0.97	45.2%	49.6%	0.92

Data Source: (MoEST 2015b)

Implementation presents a challenge in terms of addressing cultural barriers to education. For example, although there are clear government policies on the issue of young girls dropping out of school for early marriage, enforcement is a major problem. When asked who should be held responsible for this implementation failure, many interviewees blame enforcement authorities, and provincial administrators such as local chiefs. However, communities and parents also have a role to play in ensuring equal education, and could be sensitized to the value of education for both genders.

Child work, which affects both genders, is another impediment to participation in education in Kenya. Interviewees cited instances of children missing school to herd animals or to go fishing in lake regions. A 2008 report by KNBS and the International Labor Organization based on the 2005/2006 Integrated Household Survey estimated that 7.9 per cent of the 12.8 million children aged between 5 and 17 were working. Of these working children, 52.2 per cent were boys while 47.1 per cent were girls. While 4.4 per cent of children in school were working, 30.9 percent of out-of-school children were working. Moreover, almost 90% of working children were found in rural areas and the largest proportion were participating in skilled work related to farming, fishing and wildlife (KNBS and ILO, 2008). The prevalence of HIV/AIDS and resultant rates of child-headed households also interferes with school attendance and is an impediment to eliminating child labor (ibid, p.57).

## **The content of education as a source of marginalization**

Another issue that reinforces inequities in education is attributable to the rigid system of education in Kenya that is focused on promoting academic skills to the neglect of other talents. Thus, children who cannot make the grade to continue in the 8-4-4 system become marginalized. Such inequities do not only manifest across



groups but even within families. Where parents have to make difficult decisions with regard to investing in their children's education, children who perform poorly in school may be neglected. Some parents long for the reintroduction of more practical subjects such as home science, business, and arts and crafts, which were once part of the primary school curriculum, so that children who do not perform well in Class 8 examinations, but excel in other areas can become self-reliant. Furthermore, although some argue that equity and unity can only be achieved through a common curriculum, others raise concerns about forcing children from very different environments to study the same content and, what is more, to sit the same examinations.

*"I have grown up in an area where all I see is sand, camels and cattle and you want me to learn the same stuff as someone who has grown up in a tea-growing area where they see big tractors, or somebody who has grown up in a wheat-farming area with a combine harvester, and stuff like that, people with completely different backgrounds. What you should be studying is something to make whatever area you are living in better, you know, but not being forced to study something general"* (NGO staff member)

This issue may be of particular concern in the predominantly pastoralist ASAL regions of Kenya. Irrelevance of formal education to pastoralist life was a key issue identified in a recent UNICEF study exploring Education and Resilience in Kenya's Arid Lands (Scott-Villiers et al., 2015). The study, across three ASAL counties (Turkana, Wajir, Marsabit), found that a high proportion of school-leavers are neither equipped to succeed in the context of very limited job opportunities, nor able to return to rural livelihoods having been through an education system that portrays pastoralism as backward. Such disaffection and alienation may increase youth vulnerability to recruitment into crime, drugs and violence.

## 5.3 Inequalities in employment

Table 12 shows the proportion of the population across the four counties who have either no work, are employed on family land or work for a wage (note that other categories such as family business and full-time student are not shown). Nationally, the largest proportion of the population works on family land holdings (32 per cent) and much more so in rural areas (43.5 per cent). Across the four counties of interest, Tana River (9.9 per cent) is in the top ten counties in terms of the highest proportion of the population with no work, Wajir (23.1 per cent) and Garissa (22.7 per cent) are the highest. It is notable that Kenya's two largest cities, Nairobi (11.3 per cent) and Mombasa (13.1 per cent), also fall in this top ten, with high levels of no work particularly among individuals with no education or with only primary education. In Tana River, education level matters less – 10 per cent of those with no education have no work, 9.6 per cent of those with primary education have no work and 10.2 per cent of those with secondary education and above have no work. Tana River (40.6 per cent) also depends to a much greater extent on family land holdings than Kiambu (15.9 per cent), Kisumu (20%) and Nakuru (26.7 per cent). Conversely, of these four counties, Kiambu has the highest proportion of people working for a wage (38.5 per cent) and the lowest number of people with no work (7.8 per cent), although still slightly above the national level (KNBS and SID, 2013, pp. 78–90 and Annex 4.3).

Table 12: Employment BY Urban/rural, gender of household head and study counties

Percentage of population with:	No work	Employment on family agricultural holdings	Work for pay
Rural	6.3	43.5	15.6
Urban	10.2	11.4	38.1
National	7.7	32	23.7
Kiambu	7.8	15.9	38.5
Nakuru	8.2	26.7	30.3
Kisumu	8.2	20	25.3
Tana River	9.9	40.6	11.2

Source: Data selected from Chapter 5, KNBS and SID, 2013. Note 2009 census data has been used in that report.

### **Education and equal employment opportunities for youths**

The Constitution of Kenya 2010 defines a 'youth' as a person between the ages of 18 and 34, whereas the United Nations defines youths as those aged 15-24 (Republic of Kenya, 2010, p. 165, 260; UNDP, 2013, p. 7). UNICEF defines adolescents as those aged between 10 and 18. Spanning all these age ranges, 35 per cent percent of Kenya's population is between the ages of 15 and 34, while a further 43 per cent are under 14 (MoEST, 2014b, p. 10). On top of this 'youth bulge' is a high level of youth unemployment, wherein the youth unemployment rate is almost double that of the labor force of Kenya taken as a whole. That is, the unemployment rate of youths aged 15-24 is 25 per cent, relative to an overall rate of 12.7 per cent (MoEST, 2014a, p. 6, 2014b, p. 10). The high level of youth unemployment was immediately identified as among the issues underlying the 2007 post-election violence (KNDR, 2008; OHCHR, 2008, p. 3). Indeed, youths have been very much implicated in the post-election outbreak, with reports recounting their recruitment by politicians and traditional leaders to perpetrate violence along ethnic lines (OHCHR, 2008, p. 10). In the KNDR Statement of Principles, lack of youth opportunities was recognized as a contributory factor to the role that youths played in the post-election violence (KNDR, 2008, p. 2). High unemployment, especially among youths is also recognized as a threat to National Cohesion and Integration in Kenya (MoJNCCA, 2012, p. 23).

The relationship between youth education and youth livelihoods is clearly of major concern. MoEST has recognized linkages between the high population of unemployed youth in Kenya and weaknesses in formal schooling, and these linkages have been echoed by interviewees:

*"The youth unemployment level has been attributed to difficulties entering the labor market partly due to weaknesses in school curricula relevance, lack of skills (both technical and life-related) among young people with low levels of education; and mismatch between acquired skills and those demanded by the market."*(MoEST, 2014a, p. 6)

Since independence, the government has made education a priority with a belief in its contribution to economic growth. However, despite a substantial increase in access to education at all levels, availability of jobs for graduates and economic expansion have not followed at the expected rate. While there is some evidence that more education increases earnings, even university level qualifications do not guarantee jobs (Oketch, 2007, p. 150). Thus, the supply of labor has not been matched by demand. The government initially blamed this on the lack of employable skills provided by the previous 7-4-2-3 system, with the resulting response to focus more on vocational education (ibid, p. 151). However, there is now skepticism over the effectiveness of the subsequent 8-4-4 system, which was initially intended to reduce aspirations for higher education and encourage self-employment through promoting vocational and rural farming oriented skills. In fact, the 1999 Koech Commission report (ibid, p. 153) attested to its effectiveness at encouraging self-employment.

Interviewees in this study also identified a mismatch between education and job opportunities for youths. While the 8-4-4 system is preparing everyone for white-collar jobs, technical education opportunities are insufficient and do not provide up-to-date and relevant skills due to lack of investment in modern equipment. A further issue brought to light is that youth polytechnics are in general unattractive options for students and parents. These institutions, now under the mandate of county governments, are - in policy at least - being expanded to meet the needs of those who are not absorbed by secondary education institutions. However, to many, attendance at these institutions represents failure in formal education. Thus, effort not only needs to be made to expand and remodel youth polytechnics, but to also change public attitudes towards these institutions, perhaps through creating employment incentives.

In recounting the challenges in finding employment, youths noted difficulties of fulfilling not only certification but also experience requirements for securing jobs, expressing that lack of experience led to their being discriminated based on their youth. But perhaps the most intractable barrier to equal opportunity for youths is that posed by issues of nepotism, favoritism and tribalism in youth employment opportunities:

*"We cannot say that all youths have equal opportunities as far as education is concerned. As we are talking right now, there is one challenge that we have in our country, and I would call it this way, if you are going to succeed as a young man, we are brought up knowing you will have to have a Godfather, you have to have somebody that is into something that you are looking to be in, if you are going to make it to the top, and that thing has really messed up opportunities"* (Youth).

## 5.4 Social cohesion in the four counties

The concept of cohesion is prominent in Kenya's education discourse, wherein it is closely related to issues of peace and integration. For example, in the Basic Education Act of 2013 an objective of basic education is to promote "peace, integration, cohesion, tolerance, and inclusion" (Republic of Kenya, 2013, 4(ii)). While the National Commission for Integration and Cohesion (NCIC) has recently published the Social Cohesion Index, Kenyans more often speak of national cohesion. In the 2012 National Cohesion and Integration policy, national cohesion and integration is a concept which incorporates "unity, equality, freedom, democracy, absence of war, just peace, social justice and the rule of law" and is defined as:

*"a process and an outcome of instilling and enabling all citizens to have a sense as well as a feeling that they are members of the same community engaged in a common enterprise, facing shared challenges and opportunities." (MoJNCCA, 2012, p. 5)*

Its three dimensions are institutional, equity and perspectives. The NCIC built on these dimensions of cohesion in compiling the Social Cohesion Index, defining six aspects of social cohesion to be evaluated: prosperity, equity, peace, diversity, identity and trust. Perceptions were measured through the collection of survey data; objective indicators of national and county development are also included in the index.

In addition to relatively high income inequality, high poverty rates, and poor educational indicators, Tana River has the lowest social cohesion ranking of the four counties in this study as measured by the SCI<sup>2</sup>. In fact, overall, it has the fourth-lowest social cohesion index after Wajir, Garissa and Mandera, the three counties of former North Eastern Province. Conversely, Kiambu County has the highest social cohesion index of all 47 counties in Kenya. Kisumu also scores relatively well (6th highest) in terms of the social cohesion index, while Nakuru scores below the national average. Scores for each dimension are shown in Table 13.

Table 13: Kenya Social Cohesion Index 2013

	Trust	Peace	Identity	Diversity	Prosperity	Equity	SCI
National	43.7	40.1	72.7	88.6	60.5	34.6	56.6
Kiambu	44.8	39.6	63.6	93.1	86.2	68.7	65.9
Kisumu	57.3	57.3	80.5	81.5	71.1	29.6	62.7
Nakuru	55.3	38.1	41.4	96.5	37.2	49.3	53.4
Tana River	12.3	8.8	62.5	99.8	58.5	14.4	43.0

Source: (NCIC, 2013, p. 19)

Education is included within the 'prosperity' dimension and, not surprisingly the prosperity dimension of the index was higher across respondents with higher levels of education (NCIC, 2013, p. 17). It is notable that in terms of prosperity, youth unemployment was the factor most often identified by respondents as a 'major problem' (ibid, p.15). The 'equity' dimension, incorporating aspects of distribution of wealth and access to resources (e.g. water, electricity, roads, and sanitation) also increased with education. It can be seen from Table 13 that equity is the worst-performing dimension at the national level. Perceptions of trust and peace diminished with more education. Significant aspects of the 'peace' dimension included national security, law and order, tensions and social issues. In terms of the relationships between different ethnic and socioeconomic groups, how well groups were perceived to be 'getting along these days' is lower with more education (ibid, p. 14). The majority of respondents who had been victims of crime in the year prior to the survey were from urban areas and were most often young males with higher levels of education. 'Trust' incorporates aspects of trust in other groups, the courts, the government and other institutions. The identity dimension also diminished with more education. However, a higher proportion of educated respondents were 'extremely proud' to be Kenyan in contrast with respondents with no education (ibid, p.14). Diversity relates to the acceptance of other ethnic groups, as indicated by spending time and communicating with other ethnic groups as well as intermarriage. Diversity was slightly higher among those with secondary or tertiary education and slightly lower among those with no education. From the contrasting relationships between education levels and the various dimensions of the SCI, it is clear that the relationship between education and social cohesion is complex and no clear associations can be garnered without further unpacking and disaggregating each dimension.

<sup>2</sup> SCI indices for all 47 counties can be found in The Status of Social Cohesion in Kenya (NCIC, 2013, p. 19)

## 5.5 Conflict in the four counties

The quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 found an association between the occurrence of conflict and inequity in access to secondary education at the province and county levels in Kenya (Section 4.5). This section examines instances of violence in the four counties, which immediately throws up an anomaly that seems to contradict that pattern (Table 14 below). In this instance, the county with the worst indicators in terms of education, income equality and poverty would appear to have the least number of conflict incidents (Tana River), while the county with the best income equality, poverty and education indicators has a relatively high incidence of conflict (Kiambu). However, part of the explanation for this may necessitate closer inspection of the incidents of violence. For example, although there have been only 48 violent incidences in Tana River, those incidents resulted in 202 fatalities. Conversely, in Kiambu, there were over twice as many incidents but with a lower level of violence resulting in half as many fatalities. The implication is that the nature of the conflict is also an important factor in explaining any connection between poverty, inequality and conflict.

Table 14: Incidence of conflict in the four counties 2007-14

County	Conflicts between 2007-2014	Number of fatalities
Kiambu*	103	102
Kisumu**	74	132
Nakuru	142	234
Tana River	48	202

Source: ACLED \* includes ACLED administrative units Kiambu and Thika

\*\* includes ACLED administrative units Kisumu and Nyando


Of the four counties, Nakuru in the Rift Valley experienced the most incidents of conflict as well as the highest number of fatalities in the 2007-14 period (Table 14). Kenya's former Rift Valley Province, where there has been a history of grievances over land and fears of political exclusion, was the worst hit during the 2007-2008 post-election violence (Aljazeera, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2008, 2013). Of 1,300 deaths, nearly half took place in Rift Valley, with Naivasha in Nakuru County experiencing one of the worst atrocities (Human Rights Watch, 2013, pp. 27-29). The high incidence of conflict in Nakuru in 2007-2008 can be seen in Figure 10 below. A further, but much smaller, rise can be seen in 2013. A general election also took place in Kenya in 2013 and, in line with the new Constitution of Kenya 2010, the first county governments were elected.

To a lesser scale, Kisumu in Nyanza and Kiambu in Central, followed a similar pattern of rising violence in the post-2007 election period, and both also experienced a rise in conflict events in 2013 (Figure 10). Nyanza was also a hotspot during the post-election violence, with over a hundred deaths caused in most part by the police (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 49). Kisumu was one of the areas where protests began when the presidential election result was postponed, and continued after it was announced. Kenyan police have been accused of using undue force to quell these protests (Aljazeera, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2008, pp. 27-32). Figure 11 shows that 'Riots/Protests' constituted the greatest proportion of conflict events in Nakuru, Kisumu and Kiambu from 2007-2014. In Tana River, the greatest proportion was recorded as 'violence against civilians'.

The pattern is slightly different for Tana River, with a peak in conflict incidences in 2012. From Figure 10, although there was a rise from 1 to 5 incidences of conflict, Tana River had the smallest rise in conflict events during the 2007-2008 election period, and the least number of conflict events in 2013. Although Kenya's 2013 election went by relatively peacefully, the run up saw insecurity in some parts of Kenya, including Tana River (Human Rights Watch, 2014, p. 9). In 2012, violence erupted, claiming several lives and causing significant displacement (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 18). There has been a history of clashes in Tana River, particularly over land and water resources (Aljazeera, 2012; Martin, 2012). However, the 2012 violence, which was characterized by police inaction, is thought to have been spurred by dimensions beyond resource disputes. Locals have contended that politicians and a separatist group were backing local militias (Gogineni, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2013, pp. 22, 25-26).




Figure 10: Conflict incidences in the four counties 2005-2014



Source: ACLED \* includes ACLED administrative units Kiambu and Thika

\*\* includes ACLED administrative units Kisumu and Nyando

Figure 11: Number and type of conflict events 2007-2014



Source: ACLED \* includes ACLED administrative units Kiambu and Thika

\*\* includes ACLED administrative units Kisumu and Nyando

The existence of powerful, politically-affiliated gangs was a concern in Kisumu in the run up to the 2013 elections and there remains fear of their resurgence in the run up to future elections (Human Rights Watch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2015). The use of criminal gangs and militias by politicians to garner support has also been a problem in the Central region, where there are many accounts of gangs hired by politicians to threaten and intimidate voters during election times (Human Rights Watch, 2013, pp. 46–47). The data in Table 15 suggests that militias and armed groups are a cause of concern in Kiambu, both in terms of conflict events and fatalities.

Table 15: Events and Fatalities in Kiambu\* disaggregated by Primary Actor


Actor 1	Total Sum of Fatalities	Total Count of Events
Civilians (Kenya)	0	3
Militia	37	21
Political party supporters	0	2
Police Forces of Kenya (2002-2013)	15	9
Rioters/Protesters	5	54
Unidentified Armed Group (Kenya)	45	14
Grand Total	102	103

Source: ACLED \* includes ACLED administrative units Kiambu and Thika

Note: Sub-categories have been grouped together by the authors.

It can be seen from Figure 12 below that the number of fatalities peaked in both Nakuru and Kisumu in 2007 and 2008, following the election<sup>3</sup>. In Kiambu, while there was a sudden increase in event incidences, the number of fatalities was lower and increased gradually between 2007 and 2009. In Tana River, the number of fatalities peaked in 2012.

Figure 12: Fatalities in the four counties 2005-2014



Source: ACLED \* includes ACLED administrative units Kiambu and Thika

\*\* includes ACLED administrative units Kisumu and Nyando

## Conflict and insecurity as barriers to equity in education

Some counties face the added challenges of inter-group conflicts or cattle rustling. In the context of drought, scarce resources and traditional values, ASAL regions are prone to pastoralist conflict (NCIC, 2013, p. 9). Of the four focus counties, only Tana River is considered an ASAL region (Republic of Kenya, 2011, p. 9).

<sup>3</sup> ACLED data (not presented) shows that all 94 fatalities in Kisumu in 2007 occurred as event type "Riots/Protests" on December 29th and 30th 2007.

Competition over shared resources causes conflict over grazing land and water in Tana River and elsewhere. Such insecurity interferes with the smooth continuation of education, and sometimes schools are forced to close for long periods of time. In Tana River, the vastness of the county, long distances between schools and sub-county offices, lack of vehicles and poor road infrastructure present more challenging issues than in other counties. Flooding and drought are further impediments, as some schools cannot be reached when it rains, or pupils miss school to fetch water.

Low literacy levels and low capacity in some areas to begin with, particularly in the north-eastern region, has meant a shortage of local, trained teachers. Teachers for these areas must thus be sourced from other regions of Kenya. Even though government policy states that a TSC-registered teacher can be deployed anywhere, teachers from other regions of Kenya do not want to work in what are termed 'hardship areas', given the numerous disadvantages. Among the deterrents are issues of tribalism, wherein teachers from other regions are said to be foreigners. Religion is also an issue.

*"The northern part of Kenya is a majority Muslim region, the lower part of Kenya...central part is highly Christian. There are issues of religion in north-eastern Kenya, not very pronounced, but if we listen to the teachers, there are undertones - those undertones make it difficult for the teacher not from those areas - a bit uncomfortable..." (Interviewee, Nairobi)*

Recently, increased insecurity, exemplified in the recent Al-Shabaab attacks in Garissa and Mandera have served to intensify the marginalization of the north-east of Kenya in terms of education services. Teachers from Central and Western regions are refusing to work in these areas in fear for their safety, posing a grave challenge to equal educational provision across Kenya (Iaccino, 2015).

*"...because of the terrorism issue in the North Eastern, the teachers cannot go back there, not that they hate those people who live there, but they fear for their lives, yeah so the issue of insecurity may hinder the government being able to integrate the teachers." (Teacher, Nakuru)*

## Chapter Summary

The association between poverty, income inequality and education inequalities demonstrated in the quantitative analysis is consistent with trends in the four county case studies. In terms of conflict-sensitive policymaking, the qualitative analysis has highlighted the importance of considering both income inequality within regions and relative deprivation among regions, since some of the most impoverished counties in Kenya are among the most equal counties (Turkana, Wajir, Mandera).

Furthermore, pockets of poverty such as urban slums exist within some wealthier counties, which have relatively good education indicators. The trends in the Social Cohesion Index and education indicators in the four counties are also consistent with the significant positive correlation between the SCI, net enrolment ratios and gender parity of access, and the negative correlation with student-teacher ratios (indicating lower teaching resources) across all counties. While the quantitative data demonstrates an association between socio-economic, education indicators, and the incidence of conflict across all counties, the cases of Kiambu and Tana River contradicted this trend. Despite Tana River's poor performance across all other indicators and Kiambu performing the best, the latter experienced more than double the number of conflict incidences in the period 2007-2014. However, on closer examination, these incidences resulted in a much lower number of fatalities, implying that the nature of the conflict may also be an important factor in explaining any connection between poverty, inequality and conflict.

The qualitative analysis has highlighted a number of factors perceived to underlie education inequities in Kenya: wealth inequalities; differences in regional development exacerbated by insecurity; cultural and gender barriers and attitudes that assign little value to education; and the low quality of education in the most marginalized areas impede equitable access to education. The irrelevance of the formal 8-4-4 education system to youth livelihoods, particularly for pastoralist communities, has also been raised as a concern. Not only can it exacerbate marginalization of rural populations, but it may lead to increasing youth vulnerability to crime and violence, in the context of poor employment opportunities for school-leavers.





**New Words**

Shakespeare	Gift
Alphabet	Art
Compassion	Boys
Lesson	Girls
Noise	Compassion
Playground	Boys
Happy	Girls
Nearly	Boys
Nature	Girls
Assembly	Boys
Arrival	Girls
Abstract	Boys

**Field**

Forest	Cool
Tree	Hut
Charcoal	Many
Foreword	Book
Flower	Old
Plant	Environment
Grass	River
Only	Paper
Burned	Cut
Dirty	Sand




Photo: © UNICEF/Kenya2015/Primary school Moyale County



## 6. REDISTRIBUTION

This chapter discusses some important governance factors that perpetuate or exacerbate inequity in education in Kenya based on qualitative findings from the desk review, as well as key stakeholder interviews and focus groups. It also considers current policy responses to inequity and their impact on redistribution.

### 6.1 Privatisation of primary education

The number of privately-educated students has massively increased over the last decade. Private schools function predominantly at the primary rather than the secondary level, preparing their leavers for the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) examination. The number of private primary schools in Kenya increased from 4377 to 7,742 between 2009 and 2014, amounting to a 76.9 per cent increase (recall Table 6 in Chapter 4). In the same period, the number of public primary schools increased by 17 per cent, so that the proportion of primary schools which are private rose from 19 per cent to 26 per cent (MoEST, 2015b, pp. 5–6). A key reason for this proliferation is the superior performance of the majority of private schools in the KCPE examination, determining access to limited and highly sought-after public secondary school places. However, it is important to recognize that private primary education cannot be considered a homogenous sector. There are at least four main categories of private primary schools in Kenya that vary significantly in terms of catchment and quality.

**Elite private schools** may offer either international curriculums or the local curriculum. The former are oriented towards international universities, and the international job market, whereas the latter prepare students to continue within the Kenyan education system for entry into the Kenyan job market. Schools in this category charge high fees and thus cater for the rich, have adequate facilities and are keen on offering quality education, so students usually perform well.

**Faith-based schools** constitute a second category and represent a strong presence in the Kenyan education system. The Catholic Church alone either owns or sponsors almost one third of schools (nearly 6,000 primary schools and 2,000 secondary schools), although those which are sponsored are public rather than private schools (MoEST stakeholder interview).

A third category could be called **'ordinary' private schools**. They are generally small with poor facilities but tend to produce good examination results. According to one MoEST interviewee, this is achieved through focusing on 'drilling' and passing examinations rather than providing holistic education.

Another category is **low-cost private schools**, which differ from other private schools in that they draw their pupils from a much less privileged socioeconomic catchment. Non-formal, low-cost private schools that do not meet the MoEST registration criteria (e.g. owning their own land) may instead register with the Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services as 'self-help groups' or 'community organizations' (Stern and Heyneman, 2013, p. 120). These non-formal schools, which charge very low fees, provide affordable education to the poor. As such, they are located mainly in low-income residential areas and pockets of poverty, (such as urban slum areas), avoiding transport costs for children. They keep costs down to the extent that they can be even less expensive to attend than public schools. Their role in primary education provision cannot be ignored, in Nairobi alone, they number 1,750 catering for almost 800,000 children (MoEST stakeholder interview).

The increasing privatization of primary education in Kenya may have adverse implications in terms of redistribution. There is a risk that it may lead to increased inequity in provision and access to quality education. If private primary schools feed Kenya's high-status, government-maintained national secondary schools and extra-county schools, inequities across regions and between families with and without resources to invest in education are reproduced. Examples from the four focus counties in Table 16 suggest that the number of private schools and the percentage of students accessing private education are higher in counties with better socio-economic and education indicators. In Chapter 5, it was shown that Kiambu performs the best of the four counties across almost all socio-economic and education indicators, as well

as the social cohesion index, while Tana River performs the worst. Tana River also has the lowest ratio of private to public primary schools (with only 19 private schools), and, correspondingly, the lowest proportion of its students are enrolled in private education. In contrasting, almost half of Kiambu's primary schools are private, and they account for 30 per cent of enrolment.

Table 16: Access to private primary schools (selected counties) 2014

	Number of schools				Enrolment				Average school size	
	Public	Private	Total	% Private	Public	Private	Total	% Private	Public	Private
Kiambu	476	472	947	49.8%	225,798	100,972	326,770	30.9%	475	214
Kisumu	607	140	747	18.7%	236,755	26,995	263,750	10.2%	390	193
Nakuru	674	351	1025	34.2%	361,594	74,225	435,819	17.0%	537	212
Tana River	159	19	178	10.7%	46,895	2,773	49,668	5.6%	296	146

Source: EMIS

It is not clear what impact the expansion of low-cost private schools is having on real or perceived education inequities in Kenya. On the one hand, these schools may offer a relatively affordable alternative in the context of inadequate public education provision. On the other hand, even relatively low costs are beyond the reach of the poorest.

From an international perspective, supporting the growth of fee-charging primary education institutions may also lead to increasing impoverishment of the public sector. If donors bypass state education systems and invest in private education, they are potentially supporting this decline of the public sector, to the detriment of the poorest. While this might ease access challenges in the short-term, in the medium to long-term it might further polarize educational quality and outcomes, undermine trust in the state, and weaken social cohesion, all of which have the potential to increase the risk of conflict outbreak.

## ***Addressing shortcomings in the provision of free public education***

An important development in Kenyan education took place in 2003 when Free Public Education (FPE) was introduced, as a result of which enrolment at primary level has increased significantly. Between 2003 and 2011, the net enrolment rate (NER) at primary school rose from 80.4 per cent to 95.7 per cent (MoDP, 2013, p. viii). Free Day Secondary Education (FDSE) was also introduced by the Kenyan government in 2008 (Orodho, 2014, p. 477). Between 2007 and 2011, the secondary school NER went up from 24.2 per cent to 32.7 per cent (MoDP, 2013, p. viii). Although FPE succeeded in getting many more children into school, it has led to an overburdening of teachers and facilities and overcrowding in classrooms, as well as decreased quality. Inefficiencies, as well as gender and regional disparities, remain and FPE has also lost support from communities whose understanding of their role versus that of the government did not materialize (Hakijamii Trust, 2010; MoEST, 2004, p. 33). Furthermore, it is claimed that as a result of indirect costs, parents are still left to pay up to half of primary school costs (Omwami and Omwami, 2010, p. 251). Grant sizes actually decreased between 2003 and 2010. Thus, household contributions remain an important source of education funding, which although a beneficial source, has implications in terms of equity and structural discrimination against those who cannot contribute (UNESCO-IIEP, 2014).

Difficulties have also been identified with capitation funding for the FPE system. Firstly, the equity of their allocation is debated, since they are allocated on a per student basis and do not account for the relative need of some schools (UNESCO-IIEP, 2014). Some interviewees pointed out that while schools in more populous areas benefit from economies of scale, schools with lower student numbers have fewer funds to invest in materials and infrastructure. Watkins and Alemayehu (2012) have highlighted that in providing FPE funds based on the number of students enrolled in schools, areas with relatively large numbers of out-of-school children, direly in need of education investment, are neglected.

### **Controversial donor support for private education sector**

Of late, some of Kenya's key education donors have supported low-cost private education in Kenya, an approach which is not always met with approval. In particular, DfID and the World Bank's support for the expansion of Bridge International Academies (BIA) in Kenya and Uganda has come under criticism. The Bridge model was developed by US entrepreneurs with company headquarters in Massachusetts and Kenyan headquarters in Nairobi. The first academy was opened in Makuru slum, Nairobi in 2009. Now, there are hundreds of academies in Kenya (BIA website, accessed 29/06/15; Ross, 2014). BIA provides nursery and primary-level education based on what it terms 'a vertically integrated Academy-in-a-Box model', taking advantage of data, technology and economies of scale in order to offer education that is affordable to families living on under \$2/day (BIA website). BIA pay their teachers smaller salaries than those received by government primary teachers (Wanzala, 2016). This is one reason why BIA are able to deliver primary education at such low cost. Given that teacher salaries (including administrative costs) account for more than 60 per cent of public education spending in Kenya (Appleford et al., 2015; World Bank, 2014a), the savings made are substantial.

A key message from those opposed to the privatization of education is that if donors were truly committed to the goal of basic education for all, they would support governments and civil society in establishing and running no-fee, public education services (Curtis, 2015, p. 14; Right to Education Project, 2015). In a recent Global Justice Now report, "Profiting from poverty, again," DfID is criticized for supporting privatization of education and health, including direct support for BIA. It is claimed that such privatization turns services that should be public goods, into market commodities. Access to these commodities then depends on income, and thus is discriminatory to certain sections of society (Curtis, 2015, p. 14). Further opponents of privatization in education argue from a human rights point of view that in allowing for-profit education, Kenya breaches both its own legal obligations as well as international ones:

*"Like Ghana, Kenya and Uganda too are allowing education to be commercialized and are encouraging for-profit schools, such as the Bridge International Academies. This violates these States' international legal obligations to provide free basic education for all. It also contravenes the Children Act 2001 of Kenya (reinforced by the Basic Education Act 2013), by which every child is entitled to free basic education and the Government is responsible for providing such education." (Singh, 2015, p. 13)*

Nevertheless, low-cost private schools including BIA have many proponents, who argue that if governments are not successfully meeting the educational needs of every child, and are not willing to work with these private providers, then they should at very least not obstruct such private investment (The Economist, 2015).

While BIA schools cover the national curriculum content, in many ways the Bridge system has created its own unique norms and standards, which do not conform to those set out by the national government. For instance, unlike government schools with TSC-registered teachers, Bridge school teachers are not required to have a teaching qualification and are recruited from communities local to the school. Furthermore, there is a challenge in assessing the quality of these schools, which have been permitted to deviate significantly from government standards (MoEST field officer). This raises questions about the extent of influence on education governance that non-state actors should have when it conflicts with, rather than supports, national policies and regulations. External donor support may also be perceived to undermine the legitimacy of the state and may have implications in terms of both governance and peacebuilding.

## 6.2 Inequities in access to quality secondary education

*"Let's get to secondary schools where the real challenges are, the best public schools in this country are occupied by children of the rich. The poor are left to struggle with the poor performing schools in the rural areas...because of fees, the best schools are charging fees which are way above the reach of the poor. So at that level again, education is supposed to be promoting more social integration, when in reality education is promoting serious social privileges across society." (Interviewee, Kisumu)*

According to the 2014 statistical education year book, by 2014, primary school enrolment and survival to Grade 6 (of 8) had met the Education for All (EFA) objective of universal access. While figures on primary school enrolment in Kenya are promising, completion of Grade 8 and transition rates to secondary Form 1 remains a source of concern. The rate of access to Grade 8 (a proxy for primary completion) was at around 79 per cent in 2014 (MoEST, 2015b, pp. 10–11). Only 67 per cent of those who enrolled in primary school in 2007 sat the KCPE examination in 2014.

Further attrition occurs during the transition to secondary school. Only 78 per cent of approximately 880,000 candidates who sat the KCPE in 2014 were admitted to secondary school in 2015, which included all those who scored over 200 marks out of a possible 500. This means that 22 per cent did not gain admission. To a portion of those who do not transfer to secondary school, alternative opportunities are available to attend youth polytechnics, which can be found in most villages in Kenya (Burrows, 2015; Kaimenyi, 2014b). However, interviewees attest to the lack of modern equipment and a shortage of qualified instructors in these institutions. It should be noted that the transition rate to secondary schools, at 74 per cent in 2012 and projected at 78 per cent in 2015, has improved greatly in recent years, up from just 46.4 per cent in 2002 (Kaimenyi, 2014b; Nicolai et al., 2014, p. 9). On the release of the 2014 KCPE results, the then education Cabinet Secretary Joseph Kaimenyi voiced commitment to continuing this trend until all KCPE candidates can transition to secondary school (Kaimenyi, 2014b).

However, failure to gain admission to secondary school is not the only barrier to equity in post-primary education in Kenya. Indeed, the quality of Kenya's secondary schools varies greatly based on tiered stratification according to their catchment area (Lewin et al., 2011). Stratification in the education system was inherited from the colonial period when the system was racially segregated across Europeans, Asians and Africans (Amukowa, 2013, p. 205). Ex-European, ex-Asian and ex-African schools were to become high-cost, medium-cost, and low-cost schools respectively, contributing to formal socio-economic stratification of the education system. After independence, secondary schools in Kenya were categorized as 'maintained', 'assisted', 'unaided harambee', and 'unaided private' (Nyatuka and Bota, 2014, p. 51). Government-assisted schools were supported in terms of staff only, while government-maintained schools also benefited from infrastructure development. The unaided schools differed in that private schools were founded for profit-making, while harambee ('let's pull together' in Swahili) were founded and run by local communities (ibid, 51). The latter originated pre-independence to meet skill needs supposed to be provided through secondary schools, for which the government could not keep up with demand. Although improving access, they were performing worse than government schools, poorly-staffed and strayed from the national curriculum. Thus, in 1988, they were taken over to become provincial state schools (Colclough and Webb, 2012). Harambee schools helped mobilize and focus local enthusiasm for education; and provided access to secondary schooling, albeit generally of low-quality, to substantial numbers of recruits at a time when government secondary schools could accommodate only about 12-15 per cent of primary school leavers. Until the mid-1970s, they were entirely unaided after which limited assistance was provided until finally, they were fully assimilated into the government system in the late 1980s.

Before counties replaced the former administrative units in line with the Constitution of Kenya 2010, secondary schools were categorized as national, provincial, or district. Most national schools have been around for a long time and have become relatively strong and well-supported institutions (Lewin et al., 2011, p. 19). Having been established to train Kenya's senior civil servants, they are considered better off both in terms of equipment and teaching (Nicolai et al., 2014; Onderi and Makori, 2014). Provincial schools, the middle tier, were for the most part established following independence in policy efforts to expand secondary education. The lowest, broadest tier are district schools, which were newer in general and often set up through harambee initiatives (Lewin et al., 2011, pp. 19–20). In 2011, the number of national schools in Kenya stood at 18, meaning that only around 1 per cent of those sitting the KCPE was admitted from all over Kenya based on district quotas. In the same year, provincial schools took about 20 per cent of KCPE students, selected from within their province. District schools take local students and are much less selective with regard to KCPE score (Lewin et al., 2011, pp. 19–20).

Since the promulgation of the new constitution, and realignment of administrative units, interviewees now refer to four categories of schools: national, extra-county, county and district. National schools remain elite compared to county and district schools (Onderi and Makori, 2014). Regardless of the new terminology, admission to the most prestigious tier – the national schools, remains highly coveted and competition is extremely stiff. Extra-county schools are lower-ranking than national schools but are considered second



preference for KCPE graduates. By 2013, the number of national schools had expanded to 78 in line with the government's objective of at least two national schools in each county (Lewin et al., 2011; Onderi and Makori, 2014). In addition, former Cabinet Secretary Kaimenyi announced the upgrade of a further 27 schools to national status in 2014, bringing the number of national schools to admit KCPE students in 2015 up to 105 (Kaimenyi, 2014b, p. 27). According to Onderi and Makori (2014), these 27 schools are rather being categorized as 'extra-county', differentiated from national schools based on their catchment ratios. While national schools select 100 per cent of their students from all over the country, extra-county schools have a selection ratio of 40:40:20, corresponding to the percentage of students taken nationally (40), from the county (40) and from the school's district (20) (Onderi and Makori, 2014).

Considering the higher quality of education offered at the higher tiers, it is not surprising that the likelihood of qualifying for regular university programs is somewhat determined by the type of secondary school attended (Nicolai et al., 2014, p. 14). In order to gain admission to regular university programs, Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) candidates require least a B+ grade (ibid). Having not achieved the 'free entry' grade, there is an alternative parallel system of entry to university, for those with a minimum score of C+. This high cost parallel path is "beyond the reach of many families in Kenya" (Interviewee, Kisumu). Based on 2007 data from Kenya's Central Province only, Oketch and Somerset showed the differential KCSE mean scores between national, provincial, district and private secondary schools. While across the national schools, the mean KCSE score corresponded to a B+ grade, across provincial schools it corresponded to between C and C+, and in district schools to D+. Unlike private primary schools in Kenya, private secondary schools are generally low-status compared to government schools and performed only slightly better than district schools with an approximate mean grade of D+ to C- (Oketch and Somerset, 2010, pp. 16–17). Lewin et al. (2011, p. 20) estimated a district school graduate's chance of getting a maintained (free-entry) university place at about 0.5 per cent, while the chances for provincial and national school graduates were 7 per cent and greater than 50 per cent, respectively. Thus, the barriers faced by those unable to pay the high costs associated with high quality education persist throughout all levels of Kenyan education.

### ***Promoting equity through quotas for transition to secondary education***

According the Cabinet Secretary, KCPE graduates are admitted to public secondary schools in Kenya on the basis of "merit, quotas, equity, affirmative action and student choice." He assured parents and guardians of efforts to "ensure that children from disadvantaged backgrounds continue with their education" following the release of the 2014 KCPE results (Kaimenyi, 2014b). The government believes that for equity in education to be realized, children from public primary schools should be given priority in secondary school selection by means of a 3:1 admission ratio, 3 good public school students for every 1 good private school student. Private school students' better performance is put down to being able to afford expensive private schools, which have less students and more adequate resources.

Depending on where they sit as a parent, teacher, or government or county official, interviewees take different stances on how this policy relates to educational equity. Private school staff and parents almost unanimously feel that this policy is unfair. Interviewees claim private schools are disadvantaged in the selection process; parents and students with good grades become demoralized as a result and may even drop out. Another bone of contention among private school parents is that the government pays for registration to the KCPE examination for public school students only. Those sending their children to private school claim that they are also taxpayers and feel that the government is biasing opportunities against them. Private school interviewees contend that this policy does not only affect rich families but families across the board, claiming that poorer parents who realize the value of education make sacrifices to send their children to private school. While the government is trying, they are overwhelmed by the high number of candidates for secondary school. From the other aspect, inequity among the minority private school attendees and the majority of Kenyans who attend public schools is evidenced by the fact that most well-performing primary schools are private. In this sense, the government's attempts to equalize are seen as positive efforts. The difference in outcomes is put down to the difference in learning environment and public school children are said to catch up quickly.

Despite the introduction of Free Secondary Education (FSE) in Kenyan public schools in 2008, expensive boarding charges endure making primarily non-boarding district schools relatively affordable compared to national and extra-county schools. The issue of excessive fees in public schools is a governance issue, in the

sense that fee guidelines provided by the Government of Kenya are being disregarded implying weaknesses in the national management and governance of education services.

*“Let me give you an example...if the government of the Republic of Kenya whose job is to promote education in the country provides a fees guideline for schools to follow and the headmasters defy, who is wrong here, do you need to be a rocket scientist to know who is not performing his role. So the system is failing because the government is not putting its foot down...So you can see the government, the biggest stakeholder in education, gives guidelines and the teachers defy, which means that there is another person who is stronger than the government in the education sector, which is called private interests.” (Interviewee, Kisumu)*

Fees have implications not only in terms of accessing secondary education, but also on the quality of secondary education received. Oketch and Somerset suggest there are plenty of instances where even those KCPE candidates who would qualify for national or provincial schools end up attending district schools because of the lower costs (Oketch and Somerset, 2010, p. 16). Many of those interviewed for this study attest to such cases. In 2014, fees at Kenya’s most elite national boarding schools were reported to reach KES130,000 (Jacqueline Kubania, 2014; Otuki, 2014). In 2015, MoEST issued a maximum fee guidelines of KES.53,553 for boarding school fees (MoEST, 2015c). However, compliance with these guidelines has been a challenge, as highlighted by the interviewee above (Daily Nation, 2015). Thus, in spite of the Form One selection quota system being aimed at ensuring bright public school KCPE graduates have a chance to enter high-status public secondary schools, poor children are often unable to take up these opportunities.

### 6.3 Constitutional reform and devolution

It is believed that historical shortcomings in Kenya’s constitution-making have been reflected in the episodic violence that has recurred since independence, and that constitutional reform has the potential to mitigate future violence (Mkangi and Githaiga, 2012). Thus, having been legally established and guided by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission since 1998, the long and problematic process of constitutional review gained momentum through the dialogue and reconciliation agenda that followed the 2007 post-election violence (Mkangi and Githaiga, 2012; Republic of Kenya, 1998). In a 2010 referendum, Kenya’s new Constitution, replacing the previous 1963 Constitution, was finally approved by 67 per cent of voters (World Bank, 2012). Central to the 2010 Constitution of Kenya are provisions for devolved governance – a specific form of decentralization that transfers political and administrative authority to local levels. The rationale for devolution, set forth in Article 174, includes promoting democratic, accountable and participatory governance; fostering national unity; acknowledging the rights of communities to self-govern, protecting the rights of minorities and marginalized groups; bringing services closer to the people; ensuring equitable resource sharing, and enhancing checks and balances (Republic of Kenya, 2010, pp. 107–108, Art. 174). Through the new constitution two levels of government have been established - the National government, and 47 newly-demarcated county governments. The counties are smaller units than the former eight provinces, each constituting a number of former districts, now sub-counties. Kenya’s devolution is ambitions in terms of its scale from a highly-centralized system. It has also entailed establishing a new level of government rather than merely allocating additional responsibility to previously existing local authorities (World Bank, 2012).

Although it entails significant restructuring, the creation of the county governments has the potential to create a focal point to organize the disjointed structures of service delivery and administration that existed across the national, provincial and district levels (World Bank, 2012). However, in the case of education, there is a risk that such harmonization is jeopardized by partial devolution, wherein parallel governance structures have been created at the county level. To place the findings on devolved governance in context, the next section briefly describes the modified roles of key governance actors in the education sector since 2010. The Figure in Annex 2 attempts to capture the parallel systems at the national, county, sub-county and school levels that have governed the provision of public education in Kenya since the election of the first county governments in 2013.

## Impact of devolution on equity

Despite concerns raised by a few interviewees that those counties starting from a low base risk losing out through devolution, it is clear that so far, devolution has brought positive changes to areas that have previously been the most disadvantaged. In Tana River for instance, interviewees from all positions and perspectives feel that devolution is enhancing regional equality, particularly in terms of infrastructural development. Teachers in Tana River agree that devolution is bringing more funds to education, even beyond ECDE, as schools are now getting support from the counties as well as the national government, through bursaries. Thus, devolution is so far enhancing education opportunities in Tana River, not least for girls. In spite of huge financial challenges, the county government illustrates their measurable progress in both devolved subsectors. For example, they have increased the number of youth polytechnics in the county from four to six last year and are building another five this financial year. More generally, interviewees agree that for counties that have managed devolution well, the positive impacts in terms of infrastructural development are already showing. However, the risk remains that counties will prioritize differently and that while some will use their resources effectively, others will not.

## 6.4 National education financing

Education receives a significant share of the government's total budget. At 6.3 per cent of GDP in 2008, Kenya's spending was well above the Sub-Saharan African average of 3.8 per cent (MoEST, 2014a, p. 120). Furthermore, around 21 per cent of total government expenditure went towards supporting education in 2012/13 (Table 17), thus education received the highest sector budget allocation alongside infrastructure and energy (Lakin and Kinuthia, 2014).


Figure 13 below, reproduced from the World Bank's 2014 Public Expenditure Review, shows that university education was allocated 39 per cent of the 2014/15 education sector budget while primary education was allocated 26 per cent. The review suggests that this apportionment undermines equity and efficiency since a Benefit Incidence Analysis has found university education to be a pro-rich component while primary education is a pro-poor component of the education sector (World Bank, 2014a). Benefit Incidence Analysis is a method of measuring the distribution of benefits across groups (World Bank, 2003, p. 56).

Table 17: Education's share in total government expenditure relative to other sectors

Sector Allocations in Kenya's Financial Year 2012/13 Budget	Share
Infrastructure + Energy	21%
Education	21%
Security	15%
Health (Including the Global Fund under the Ministry of Finance Estimates)	9%
Planning and Regional Development	6%
State Administration	6%
Parliament, AG, Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions	5%
Water and Irrigation	4%
Agriculture	3%
Gender, Youth and Culture	3%
Lands, Housing, and Environment	3%
International Relations and Commerce	2%
Government Investment and Public Enterprises inc. Economic Recovery Programme	1%

Source: (Lakin and Kinuthia, 2014) The education sector share of the budget was calculated by combining MoE, MoEST, TSC allocations.

Figure 13: Subsector shares of total education sector budget 2014/15



Source: World Bank, 2014b, p. 17

Recurrent expenditure remains twice the size of development expenditure in Kenya (17.6 per cent of GDP and 7.1 per cent of GDP in 2013/14, respectively) and although the relative share of development spending reached its 30 per cent threshold in 2011/12 it has since fallen back below the minimum target (World Bank, 2014a). Much of central government education funds are used to cover recurrent costs such as paying staff, administrative and management costs, as well as school capitation grants (they also support bursaries) (MoEST, 2014a, p. 120). In fact, recurrent expenditures constitute all TSC expenditure and a very large percentage of MoE, MoHEST expenditures, with relatively low spending on development (Table 18). As much as 87 per cent of the greatly-decentralized education budget goes directly to teachers and schools in the form of FPE and FDSE per student capitation grants. Much of the remaining 13 per cent is used to fund MoEST SAGAs (ibid, p.120).

Table 18: Recurrent vs. Development Education Expenditure 2011/12

Sub-Sector	Total Expenditures (Kshs. Millions)	Recurrent (Kshs. Millions)	Recurrent as % Total	Development (Kshs. Millions)	Development as % Total
MoE	36,389	32,303	89%	4,086	11%
MoHEST	47,916	46,583	97%	1,333	3%
TSC	112,425	112,425	100%	0	0%

Source: (Republic of Kenya, 2012, pp. 54–57). Figures used for these calculations are “Actual Expenditures” rather than “Approved Estimates”.

On the other hand, county funds largely support infrastructure development and provide student bursaries. Since 2013/14, resources going to county governments along with spending responsibility have been significantly decentralized, whereas before, county spending was funded through the Local Authority Transfer Fund (ibid, 120-121). The Basic Education Act 2013 also allows for a transfer of functions to the county governments relating to infrastructure development in non-devolved education sectors, in which case the national government can transfer funds through conditional grants (Republic of Kenya, 2013, 26).



Coordination between levels of national and subnational financing, as well as with development partners, has been noted as a challenge, particularly in terms of infrastructure development. One outcome of poor coordination is the establishment of multiple small and large schools in the same area, without enough teaching and learning resources for them all (MoEST, 2014a, p. 123).

### Chapter Summary

Unequal outcomes at the primary level are linked to wide disparities in the quality of education provided, particularly across public and private schools. Such inequities are reinforced in the transition to secondary school. The government has made efforts towards redistribution through the Form One selection quota system, which favors public over private school KCPE graduates, and allows students from disadvantaged regions to enter national and extra-county schools with lower grades. However, poor students are often unable to take up their admission to high-status public secondary schools due to the high boarding school fees charged. On one hand, private school pupil advantage in gaining access to prestigious national schools causes resentment among parents, principals and teachers working in the public primary schools. On the other hand, the quota system is a source of contention among private school parents and staff. While demand for places at secondary level continues to exceed supply, coming up with ratios and quotas that are globally perceived to be fair is a seemingly impossible challenge.

Free primary and secondary education policies are attempts to ensure that every child has access to education. However, aspects of governing FPE and FSE have been criticized, including insufficiencies in capacity and weak monitoring which jeopardizes effective and transparent financial management. Furthermore, whether or not the allocation of funds to free education is equitable is in itself a contentious issue. Indeed, policymakers are faced with difficult decisions when it comes to allocating funds in an equitable manner. The potential of current school capitation funding to promote redistribution is critiqued for two reasons. In the first place, since FPE funding is based on per-pupil allocations, schools in more expansive and sparsely populated areas have fewer students and thus do not benefit from the same economies of scale in order to invest in infrastructure and materials. Secondly, many of these same areas, particularly ASALs, have a high number of out-of-school children and are in acute need of greater educational investment. In allocating the bulk of education funds to reflect the number of children attending school, not enough weight is currently given to the total number of school-aged children in these counties and other indicators of relative disadvantage (Watkins and Alemayehu, 2012).

In terms of addressing regional inequities, the most marginalized counties in Kenya are already seeing the benefits of infrastructural development that can be brought through devolution. In this sense, devolution can be seen as a positive move towards redistribution. However, there remains great scope for a more concerted focus on targeting inequitable access to quality education aimed at marginalized regions and communities, which would support both sustainable learning and peace and development objectives.

## 7. REPRESENTATION

This chapter discusses the opportunities for and impediments to participation of key stakeholders in the management and governance of education in Kenya. It is also concerned with governance issues that hinder equitable education service delivery and may fuel tensions among implementers and beneficiaries.

### 7.1 Participation of implementers and beneficiaries in decision-making

When asked to identify weaknesses in implementation, some stakeholders pointed to the issue of inadequately involving implementers and beneficiaries in the policymaking process. Although consultation and the participation of education stakeholders has improved in line with the new constitution, many interviewees still describe a top-down approach. Some feel that this impedes successful implementation as those on the ground are more likely to half-heartedly implement policies that they were not involved in creating. Of particular importance is creating a sense of ownership among teachers who play a key role in implementation at the school level. While there are established channels for teachers and head teachers to voice their concerns (unions and head teacher associations), most feel that very little input from the ground is taken into consideration by policymakers. While many teachers interviewed felt that education governance would benefit from their involvement, they expressed concerns that policies come from political decisions and their role is merely to implement.

There is much emphasis on participation in Kenyan policy, indeed it is a constitutional requirement. However, in practice it may be perceived as more of a formality than a genuine attempt at inclusion. One interviewee referred to an element of public participation as being done merely to meet the requirements of the law rather than genuinely seek opinion of the participants. Another interviewee described participation at the school level through board of management structures as more theoretical than active.

*“Where these boards of management exist in secondary schools, they consist of people who have been selected by their friends. In primary schools, school management teams consist of people who are friendly with the head teachers, so you cannot make any change at that level, because everybody’s supporting the status quo at the moment.” (NGO staff member)*

Selection and appointment to school boards of management is perceived by some as biased and despite being well articulated in the Basic Education ACT of 2013, their composition is not always as representative as anticipated. This governance issue may reinforce exclusion and exacerbate tensions within the school community, since the BoM has some level of control over school resources, school development and tendering processes.

### 7.2 Limited understanding of devolved governance structures

It became clear from interviews with parents, youths and even teachers that community understanding in relation to devolution of political authority as opposed to the de-concentration of education services is lacking:

*“I think also the county government should know the roles of the county government, since most people don’t know. We should be given civic education on the...issue of the devolved government. We don’t know most of the functions of the county government.” (Parent)*

*“So, I would say, it would have had an impact if everybody had a basic knowledge of what devolution is, because not everybody knows what devolution is, so if people are to be enlightened, they would get*

*access to their rights in regard to devolution. Because there are some people who believe devolution belongs to a certain group. Or it's something else that does not involve them, so I think that basic information is also important to the people in the local area.” (Youth)*

*“We didn’t know, when we were passing the constitution and when we agreed that we want to be devolved, we did not actually understand the workings of a devolved government. If we were to vote again on devolved government I think most people would vote we don’t want that, I think we would say we don’t want so many conflicts. We are looking for peace and this devolved government is creating more conflict, you can see them fighting in the county level.” (Head teacher)*

This lack of understanding of devolved political governance structures as opposed to the deconcentrated administrative approaches for education in Kenya can not only result in disillusionment among those whose expectations have not been met, but is curbing one of the very objectives of devolution of political authority – inclusive participation of communities in decision-making. The latter is a fundamental objective of devolution and is held as such in the constitution:

*“to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them” (Republic of Kenya, 2010, pp. 107–108, Art. 174)*

Furthermore, advocates of devolution in education claim that key benefits lie in enhancing local participation and downward accountability (Mbataru, 2014).

Mkangi and Githaiga (2012, p. 1) hold that if the Constitution of Kenya 2010, including provisions for devolution, is to address the drivers of conflict in Kenya, there needs to be “sustained, extensive civic education”. Although civic education had been undertaken in advance of the referendum, there was limited time and “information was adulterated and distorted by politicians and religious leaders” (Mkangi and Githaiga, 2012, pp. 14–15). Interviewees in this study agree that there is not only a need to provide more civic education, but to also provide unbiased civic education, in which the government should take a lead role.

*“Actually, what has lacked is civic education and, it is not just civil education because most of the civil education that have got in Kenya are political civic education whereby somebody wants to educate you on what they feel will benefit them at the end of the day, that I’m giving you education so that you can sing to the tune of what I say, but if we have a very fair and impartial civic education where you take things at the ear, and you will not mistranslate situations to fit your interests, then I believe with time people can get the relevance.” (Interviewee, Nairobi)*

Notwithstanding this issue, interviewees already perceive visible improvements in consultation in line with the constitutional mandate for public participation. In this sense, devolved governance is expected to improve monitoring and accountability structures, especially if all stakeholders, including communities, are sensitized to their roles.

## 7.3 Capacity and transparency in education sector governance and management

### **Budget execution and absorption of development funds**

Absorption of development funds is a challenge in Kenya, particularly in the infrastructure sector which accounts for the largest share of development spending (Table 9 and World Bank, 2014b, pp. 12–13). Figures from 2013/14 showed that half of the KSh439 billion capital expenditure allocated across Kenya by the national government returned to the treasury unspent (Africa Confidential, 2014, p. 7). In addition, county governments are facing challenges in executing their budget allocations as can be seen in Table 19. One major impediment to absorption of county allocations may lie in county government capacity to prepare acceptable budgets in order for funds to be released from the national government to the counties (Mkutu et al., 2014, p. 26). Given that counties are in a good position to promote the development of infrastructure

locally and interviewees are perceiving benefits for the most disadvantaged regions, strengthening county capacity to absorb funds is crucial. With regard to education, about 16 per cent of the 2013/14 approved education budget was not executed (from Table 19).

Table 19: Differences in approved and executed sector spending 2013/14

Spending as % GDP	Approved Sector Spending (%GDP)	Executed Sector Spending (%GDP)	Difference in approved and executed spending
Education	5.8	4.9	-0.9
County Governments	5.4	3.4	-2
Energy, infrastructure and ICT	4.9	2.0	-2.9
Public Admin & International Relations	3.6	2.7	-0.9
Governance, Justice, Law & Order	2.6	2.3	-0.3
National Security	1.9	1.9	0
Agriculture, Rural & Urban Development	1.3	1.0	-0.3
Environment, Water & Natural Resources	1.1	0.6	-0.5
Health	0.8	0.6	-0.2
Social Protection, Culture & Recreation	0.4	0.3	-0.1
Economic & Commercial Affairs	0.3	0.2	-0.1

Data source: (World Bank, 2014a)

In line with devolution, an “Equalization Fund” was foreseen in addition to the equitable share county allocations, however, as of 2012, how much of this latter Fund was to be spent on education had not been decided (MoE and MoHEST, 2012, p. 8). In the first year of devolution 2013/14, equalization funds were projected at Ksh3.4 billion. However, along with an even greater amount in conditional grants for donor funded projects, equalization funds were not transferred to the counties (World Bank, 2014a, p. 33). Actualization of the equalization fund is important in ensuring that those counties starting from a disadvantaged base, with relatively little own revenue income, are enabled to catch up through devolution. As can be seen from the Table 20, using the examples of the four counties visited in this study, counties such as Tana River are much more dependent on national revenue sources than others. Although they are doing better than the previous local authorities, overall, devolved county governments are not meeting their own revenue collection targets. There are significant variations in revenue collection across counties, with implications for equity in service delivery (ibid, 33-34).

Table 20: Sources of county expenditure from County Budgets: 2013-2014

	National Revenue		Own Revenue	Conditional Grants
	Equitable Share	Equalization Fund		
Kiambu	50%	0%	50%	0%
Kisumu	56%	0%	32%	13%
Nakuru	81%	0%	19%	0%
Tana River	85%	6%	3%	6%

Source: CRA, 2013



### **Management of school capitation grants and the Constituency Development Fund**

In terms of education governance, the capacity of head teachers and boards of management to effectively manage Free Primary Education (FPE) funds disbursed directly to schools has been questioned. Concerns over a lack of monitoring and auditing mechanism to ensure that 100 per cent of the money gets to the school and to the child were also raised in the interviews. Transparency in financial management has been a major issue, brought to light not least by a Ministry of Finance audit report in June 2011 revealing substantial misappropriation of funds meant to support free primary education. From 2005 to 2009, US\$48 million was unaccounted for. As a result, some important bilateral donors, including the UK and Canada have become reluctant to channel aid through the Kenyan government (Transparency International, 2013; World Bank, 2014b). For example, the UK Department for International Development limited its use of government systems to deliver aid as specified in the 2011-2015 operational plan (DfID, 2011, p. 6).

Of interviewees who referred to these events, one raised concerns over how finances are monitored and accounted for, and lack of literacy in financial management among primary school head teachers, alongside a national shortage of school auditors. Although investment in capacity building may be viewed as a risk, donors must also acknowledge how much is being wasted if only a proportion of investments are making it to schools or to children. Thus, some suggested that donors should reconsider how to approach capacity building.

*“Suppose in NESP or GPE we had budgeted an amount of money even to employ auditors, accountants... that one for me I think the donors can think again, and not assume these things are there, that the government has accountants.” (Interviewee, Nairobi)*

Addressing the same incident, another interviewee spoke of a role for the international community in strengthening grassroots advocacy. By designing policies at the top, there is failure to empower people on the ground, who could otherwise be aware of what is happening and involved in playing an oversight role. Therefore, programs should be designed in such a way that they also build capacity for lobbying and advocacy, so that the beneficiaries are not just “idle onlookers” (NGO staff member).

Another important source of education funding for school infrastructure and bursaries is the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), about 30 per cent of which is expended on education (MoEST, 2014c, pp. 120–121). Many of the interviewees in this study referred positively to the CDF, which while insufficient, has had an important role particularly in supporting students through bursaries at higher levels of education and supporting infrastructure development at the primary level. Management of the CDF is organized through the local Member of Parliament in each constituency. Committees are elected by locals from within the constituency, with representation from each ward including both male and female members (interviews with CDF members). In terms of efficient use of CDF resources, it is important to ensure that when funds are used to expand infrastructure, associated recurrent costs can also be provided for (World Bank, 2014a, p. 22).

### **Availability of reliable indicators**

An essential factor in capacity building in the education sector is the development of standards and indicators (Davies, 2009, p. 39). The collection of reliable data in Kenya is important in order to identify inequity, and monitor and evaluate the long-term benefits of existing programs, such as vocational training for youths. In recent years, the availability of national and sub-national data in Kenya has been an issue. According to the NESP 2013-2018, no Joint Sector Reviews were undertaken between 2010 and 2014, a statistical yearbook had not been published for three years, and no official education data had been reported to UNESCO Institute for Statistics since 2009 (MoEST, 2014a, p. 109). However, in 2014, MoEST – with support from development partners – managed to overcome the challenges of collecting reliable data and developing a comprehensive Education Management Information System. This positive step is reflected in the recent publication of the 2014 Basic Education Statistical Yearbook (MoEST, 2015b).

Another step towards better monitoring and evaluation is the Teacher Performance and Integrity in Kenya (TePIK) pilot project in six Kenyan counties. TSC launched the pilot in 2012 in tertiary institutions. Already supported by DfID, it is hoped that the project can be extended across Kenya with further financial assistance. With over 90 per cent of the TSC budget directed towards teacher remuneration, the Commission

is limited in financial resources for development and training (stakeholder interview). It is also crucial that monitoring and reporting mechanisms are perceived as learning activities and not a means to assign blame (Davies, 2009, p. 40). Furthermore, in the case of teacher appraisal, openness and transparency is important in ensuring that teachers and unions are willing to participate. While reliable educational data is vital for measuring sustainable learning objectives, it is also vital for identifying inequities that might fuel broader grievances and drive conflicts.

### 7.4 State legitimacy and trust in the education system

It has been claimed that education sector decisions have been subject to ethnic favoritism and political motivations, with implications for the distribution of educational resources (Colclough and Webb, 2012; Keriga and Bujra, 2009). Amutabi (2003) holds the politicization of education decision-making responsible for the crisis in Kenyan education, pointing to the reform to the 8-4-4 system, the secondary education quota system, model schools, and decisions in higher education as examples of policies that were implemented by politicians disregarding the recommendations of experts. The non-formal Harambee schools mentioned earlier also became an instrument of patronage after state takeover. Although it is illegal to open schools without Ministry of Education approval, many of these schools were actually sponsored by and named after politicians (Amutabi, 2003; Colclough and Webb, 2012). Thus, according to Amutabi, these schools have continued to mushroom and waste valuable government resources, despite extremely poor provision of skills for employment or progression to university. What is more, he argues that 'clan-based' and 'politically fronted' schools threaten national unity. These issues had already been recognized in the Ominde Commission's report in 1964, but ignored by policymakers (Amutabi, 2003, p. 130).

In one group discussion about access to national secondary schools, it also became apparent that appropriation of Harambee schools by the national government is a source of grievance in some communities. It is especially controversial if the locally-built schools are then promoted to national school status. Local communities and leaders feel that if prestigious secondary schools are in their locality, they rather than 'outsiders' should be benefitting from them as suggested in the excerpt below.

*"I remember some time back, when they started uplifting the schools to the national school status, there were some leaders who were complaining that now our schools are being taken by outsiders, you see, because when the school becomes a national school, it will take the students from the whole country, so some leaders from other parts like in Western, they were saying no, we can't agree with them to be taken by other people, we are the ones who have built the school... When you build the schools that's when the government comes in, but we don't build you the school, you will stay without the school, even the government will not be able to help you, but when you start a school in your area...like in our time there were those schools which were called Harambee secondary schools, they were started by the parents, they started as Harambee schools, then when the government comes in, it becomes a government school." (Parent)*

Thus, the establishment of more national and extra-county schools has not been without its challenges. The schools draw from all over the country based on quotas, which is usually perceived positively as a means to promote national unity and cohesion.

*"...like now we have a problem here in Kiambu, some of the biggest national schools are in our county and have many children, but only a few are taken because of the quota, and then you feel that you are not benefitting as much as a community..." (Teacher, Kiambu)*

Indeed, in this case, with limited access to quality secondary schooling, it is difficult to reconcile the needs of all stakeholders. Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that decisions on school locations are not politicized. Building schools for political reasons can not only be a source of contention among groups, but can also be a source of inefficiency. One interviewee pointed out that in some instances, new schools are opened because of politics and also religion in situations where adding new classes to existing schools would be a much more viable option. A new school requires more teachers than an already existing school and so this challenges the mandate of the TSC, as it depletes the teaching force.

Critics of further devolution also think education would become even more politicized under county governments than it has been under the national government. Some feel that the improvements in governance envisioned in constitutional reform remain elusive to the extent that ‘bad governance and corruption’ have been decentralized.

*“Well, as you would expect resources to be adequately distributed, it is still a source of conflict among people. In other words, if you allow me, bad governance and corruption has been decentralized and devolved.” (Field officer)*

Although in essence devolution is recognized as a good thing, interviewees are not convinced that real change will come through its implementation. Cornell and D’Arcy have found that the 2013 county elections saw ‘insiders’, that is, “members of the existing political elite who used their networks and records of delivering patronage to win”, as more successful than ‘outsiders’ (Cornell and D’Arcy, 2014, p. 174). Their case studies also showed that a track record of supplying patronage was an important factor in winning votes. In this sense, constitutional reforms may only be successful if accompanied by effective civic education.

Some interviewees were encouraged that more checks and balances for accountability have been brought about by the introduction of the new constitution:

*“The government we had before, there’s no person who was checking each other, now the governor is there and is checked by the senate, the senator also, is also looked upon by all the [Members of County Assemblies] we have there, so everything is done now under supervision, and that’s why we are now coming up with people who are told you are corrupting, before then you could not hear such a thing, because nobody is checking what you are doing.” (Parent)*

## Chapter Summary

To ensure the success of the new local authorities, it is imperative that the financial resources to implement devolved functions are released to the county level in a timely and transparent fashion as stipulated in the constitution. This is especially crucial for historically-marginalized counties, with minimal own-revenue sources. These counties are particularly dependent on national government income and the equalization funds in order to ‘catch up’. While counties are not responsible for the provision of primary, secondary and university education, they may be best placed to support infrastructural development in these subsectors as well. The Basic Education Act of 2013 allows for such responsibility to be transferred to the county governments through conditional grants (Republic of Kenya, 2013, 26). However, it is also crucial that governance capacity is developed within all counties to ensure that each county government can prioritize, budget, and manage their resources effectively. This will also require resolving the tensions between political devolution and administrative de-concentration of education services still directly overseen by MoEST. Furthermore, civic education can enhance representation of all stakeholders and help to ensure that bad governance systems based on patronage and favoritism are not devolved but transformed. It is important that each actor at the national, county and school level understands and plays their role as set out in the constitution.

State legitimacy can be an especially important factor in fragile and conflict-affected settings and state education is a component of state legitimacy (Davies, 2009). Governance issues like corruption and political patronage are perceived to hamper equitable provision of education services, undermining citizens’ trust in the state and fueling grievances that can undermine social cohesion and give rise to conflict. Such practices need to be urgently addressed through enhancing checks and balances, transparency in financial management, and inclusive participation in decision-making processes.

With support from international donors, MoEST and the TSC have begun making much-needed efforts towards establishing reliable standards and indicators in the education sector, as well as effective systems of data collection. Availability of reliable data should also enhance transparency, as well as evaluation of teaching and learning. Reliable data would also help the government to plan services in ways that address inequities and help the most marginalized.



Photo: © UNICEF/Kenya2015/Mobile school learning in slum areas of Kenya



## 8. RECOGNITION AND RECONCILIATION

This chapter focuses on how education policy can be aimed to promote recognition and reconciliation, and also considers the importance of effective management and governance in ensuring their success.

### 8.1 School diversity and integration

#### ***National schools, quotas and the integration of students across regions***

In place since the 1980s, the quota system is one wherein 85 per cent of students admitted to a provincial secondary school in Kenya are drawn from within the school's district and the rest from the school's province. To the extent that this system has implications for ethnic diversity at the secondary school level, it is believed by many to act contrary to the promotion of national unity and cohesion (Kataka, 2014; Mwaka et al., 2013; Waweru, 2011; Weber, 2009). While the rationale for implementing this system was to "strengthen local interest and commitment towards development and maintenance of their schools", it is also perceived to have been motivated by political favoritism, largely limiting the privileges of the country's best schools to certain ethnic groups (Amutabi, 2003; Republic of Kenya, 1988 cited in Weber, 2009).

On the other hand, interviewees in this study agree that the recent expansion of national schools, towards the aim of at least two per county, is a positive move in terms of promoting peace, as these encourage integration of communities and ethnicities within schools.

*"We have two national schools per county and 47 counties, so it means that Kenyans are getting integrated from all over the country." (MoEST field officer)*

A further effort to promote national cohesion is the Greatness United volunteering program initiated by the Kenyan Presidency and implemented through the MoEST directorate of basic education. Under this program, university graduates take part in a cultural exchange, living as part of the community in a county outside their home area. At the same time, they teach in a partner primary school, adding to a second aim of the program to enhance primary education outcomes (Republic of Kenya, n.d., accessed 05/11/2015). The program is relatively new; 138 volunteers graduated in the pilot year (2014-2015), but numbers were expected to double for the next cohort. Interviews with MoEST representatives suggest that the program is doing well and has potential in terms of bringing peace and integration.

#### ***Insecurity as a barrier to integration of students and teachers across Kenya***

However, for those Kenyans who lament the 1980s when high school students could enroll anywhere, secondary school quotas and national school places alone are not the problem and solution. There is a perhaps graver issue, particularly prominent since the post-election violence in 2008. One teacher claimed that things have changed since then; students now choose to stay where they are. Even where children are accepted to national schools, parents are afraid to send them and opt for provincial schools instead. Another interviewee recounted being forced to move their child from a well-performing national school to a poorer performing one when violence erupted and it was no longer safe to travel through some areas of the country.

Interviewees also hold that ethnic diversity among teachers in the school is important in promoting peace, and complements diversity among students.

*"The teachers also come from all over the country, we have [different tribes] in the staffroom, that we are able to co-exist as a family, can also promote peace, and the students are also drawn from all over the country, so we have a diverse staff and a diverse student body." (Teacher, Kisumu)*

*"...if it was a situation where all teachers are Kikuyu, the other tribes will feel we don't belong. So the students also feel, oh I'm a Kalenjin, there's a teacher who is a Kalenjin, so she feels that, yeah, she belongs. So if the government can mix the teachers...it would help. (Teacher, Nakuru)*

The national policy for teacher deployment supports the integration of teachers since a teacher can be deployed anywhere in the country. However, implementation in practice is an issue. Aside from the insecurity associated with terrorism in some regions, teachers across the board are faced with fears of not belonging. Deep-rooted tribal rather than national identities are seriously challenging the government's efforts for integration and promoting equity through teacher deployment. Due to political affiliations along ethnic lines, teachers, like students, were withdrawn from or forced to leave certain areas during the post-election violence for safety reasons.

*"Ah, the government may not be able to do much, because even us, I think we have, we have grown up knowing we are tribes, we are tribes, not more of a nation isn't it? You may bear me witness. So if I'm taken to another place, it is like I feel I don't belong here, so the government may try as much as it can, because I know they are doing a lot of that, but now the people themselves, out of unfounded fear, or because of what has happened in the past, the tribal animosity and all that you fear, what if it comes again, what will happen, so it's not that they hate the tribe or something, but you fear what will happen, yeah, the fear of the unknown, yeah." (Teacher, Nakuru)*

### **Violence and undemocratic governance in schools**

Interviewees in this study have suggested that in the absence of fair treatment, or faced with excessive punishment, students can also acquire values that are contrary to building social cohesion and supporting peacebuilding processes.

*"...there shouldn't be punishments or violence in schools because peace is about not having violence, and the fact that children are beaten in schools that's violence in itself." (Youth)*

Corporal punishment in Kenyan schools was abolished in 2001. Nevertheless, participants in this study have echoed previous research by attesting that corporal punishment continues to take place (Mweru, 2010). Mweru's study involving a sample of 42 primary school teachers revealed that teachers are aware of this law, but hold beliefs that sustain the use of corporal punishment regardless. Defiance of this law reveals a number of issues in terms of education governance. First of all, monitoring and prosecution mechanisms are not in place in schools in order to ensure compliance:

*"I was thinking of what I said earlier about oversight. I think the way we deal with certain matters, like now the cabinet secretaries are being called off because of corruption, we need now to have oversight even in our schools...so we need oversight, not only in some serious cases like corruption but also in school, we need when a teacher does this now this is law, when you do this, that is law, you just resign there is no other choice, you resign and another person is called up because now the other teacher will learn from that." (Youth)*

*"We have a law against caning pupils in school. Since 2002, that's when corporal punishment was banned in this country, but do we enforce that? But discipline only happens in severe, serious cases or maybe cases where parents have taken the issue to the police." (Interviewee, Nairobi)*

Secondly, the teachers in Mweru's study claimed overcrowded classes since the introduction of free primary education encouraged the use of corporal punishment, one more imperative for increasing teacher supply. While teachers receive some training in child development, it is apparently not effective in ensuring that they employ non-violent methods of discipline. Youths interviewed also recognized the importance of guidance and counselling for teachers before they go into class to deal with their frustrations, as well as improving the system of molding and mentoring so that teachers do not end up choosing a career to which they are not suited. It was particularly important to them that children understand why they are being disciplined. Exposing children to fair and democratic practices in school from an early age is seen as crucial to nurturing peaceful youths and adults as well as addressing a culture of corruption that provokes conflict.

For us to understand the essence of being peaceful...you must start it in primary, you must say that this is our country and we need to protect it, so the little girls and boys in nursery school, ECDs, sing these patriotic songs, they need to know what brings conflict is this corruption, but if the child's mind is corrupted from, if the teacher is not fair to the child, the parents are not fair to the child as early as early childhood level of education, then that means that the child is going to primary when he or she is aware of inequalities and therefore himself and otherwise...coincide in conflict, by the time they are in secondary school, the whole issue has been magnified..." (Interviewee, Nairobi)

Several interviewees also viewed student councils and the democratic election of student representatives as a means of promoting peaceful co-existence.

One effort to address the whole learning environment, including these informal aspects of schooling, has been made through the concept of Child Friendly Schools (CFS) (Njeng'ere, 2014, p. 7). The concept has been embraced by the Government of Kenya and supported by donors including UNICEF and USAID (MoEST, 2014a, pp. 59–60). To date, CFS has reached 356 schools in Kenya across eight ASAL counties. Initiatives focus on several aspects of schooling including quality, access, transition, inclusion, health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), protection and participation. They also deal with issues of punishment and gender parity.

## 8.2 Education and employment for marginalized and refugee youths

While some evidence suggests religious reasons rather than economic frustrations as the primary motivation for recruitment into Al-Shabaab (Botha, 2014), it is believed that extremist groups exploit grievances among Muslim populations related to marginalization, alienation and victimization, both past and present. Disaffection from government among ethnically or religiously-defined groups is thought to contribute to radicalization and the expansion of Al-Shabaab into Kenya (Anderson and McKnight, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014). This suggests that peacebuilding efforts should address perceptions of division across ethnically and religiously diverse groups:

*"As long as Kenyan citizens, especially those on the fringes of society, exclusively identify with an ethnic or religious identity that is perceived to be under threat, radicalization will continue to increase." (Botha, 2014, p. 24)*

In her study on reasons for recruitment of Kenyan and Somali-Kenyan nationals into Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council, Botha found that more years of schooling was not central to dissuading radicalization. The majority of recruits included in her research were estimated to have more than nine years of schooling. Quality of education can matter in so far as education quality is related to employment opportunities; 50 per cent of Al-Shabaab respondents and 51 per cent of MRC respondents were unemployed when they were recruited, and many more were working in low-income jobs (Botha, 2014, p. 17). Livelihood issues are also seen as critical based on reports that youths, even non-Muslims, have been offered money to join Al-Shabaab (Mkutu et al., 2014).

Currently, the counterterrorism strategy in Kenya is highly criticized for 'collective punishment' measures and 'ethnic profiling' targeting Somalis and even Muslims more generally. For instance, perceived scapegoating of Kenyan Somali populations such as the arrest of more than 2500 residents suspected of living in Nairobi illegally (Operation Usalama Watch in April 2014), is thought to exacerbate alienation among these groups (Anderson and McKnight, 2014; Lind et al., 2015). Lind et al. have described the strategy as:

*"..one of 'othering' an entire population as somehow threatening, providing the rationale for collective punishment measures" (Lind et al., 2015).*

Operation Usalama is also thought of as part of broader efforts to restrict the number of Somali refugees in Kenya, also a perceived security threat (ibid, 29). There are more than 565,000 refugees in Kenya (United Nations, 2014, p. 2). 81 per cent of these are Somalis, 357,000 of which live in Dadaab refugee camp in Garissa

(Lind et al., 2015). Immediately following the April 2015 Garissa attack, Vice President Ruto announced the closure of Dadaab refugee camp, despite no evidence that refugee camps are a source of radicalization (Simpson, 2015).

Given education's potential role for improving livelihood opportunities and integrating Kenya's ethnically and religiously diverse population, it can be seen as an important element of a security strategy that moves away from the highly criticized 'collective punishment' measures as perceived by many in Kenya. As youths are the primary target of radicalization, and livelihoods a factor in their vulnerability to recruitment, ensuring alternative opportunities for youth is crucial. Nevertheless, the present system appears to be failing in terms of equalizing employment opportunities, and governance responses to insecurity appear to be exacerbating rather than addressing deeply-ingrained issues of marginalization and division.

Some interviewees have identified the government's National Youth Service (NYS) program as one initiative that addresses the gap in youth opportunities. The NYS plans to recruit about 13,000 young Kenyan men and women from all over Kenya twice a year, especially jobless youths, and equip them with technical skills that can be of benefit to them as well as the nation. A further objective of the NYS is to preserve young people from risks of recruitment into vigilante and terrorist groups (NYS, accessed August 2015).

### 8.3 Impact of devolution of political authority on conflict and social cohesion

At this stage, five years after the new constitution was approved and two years after the election of county governments, interviewees feel that devolution has caused some confusion over roles that have yet to be clarified. The county and national government structures are supposed to be "distinct and inter-dependent" (Republic of Kenya, 2010, p. 14, Art. 6(2)), but implicitly, there is competition for supremacy. While both governments recognize that they are required by the constitution to consult and cooperate, and that intergovernmental fora have been legislated for, an ethos of collaboration is yet to materialize. In fact, within this new governance framework where county governments work alongside decentralized MoEST and TSC officers (essentially a parallel form of decentralization known as 'de-concentration'), a number of issues and conflicts have arisen, in part arising from these different forms of decentralization. In particular, there is an ongoing push and pull between teacher unions and their members, the TSC, the Ministry, by whom school boards of management are nominated, and school sponsors' with regard to the employment of teachers and appointment of head teachers. For example, at the time of interviewing, the TSC and teacher unions had been battling in court with county governments for more than one year to reach a legal interpretation of who is in charge of employment of ECDE teachers. While the case is pending, more recently it is expected that the TSC will release the function to county governments and some counties are now employing ECD teachers, to the discontent of the unions (Education News, 2015a, 2015b). Overall, it appears that the three centers of power, MoEST, the TSC and county governments have yet to streamline their functions.

To the extent that marginalization is a driver of conflict, the feeling that devolution is bringing progress in previously marginalized counties is expected to promote peace. On the other hand, if, as many interviewees attest, counties are becoming more tribal, this has negative implications for integration. Indeed, most interviewees believe that devolution is increasing rather than abating tribalism, particularly when it comes to employment opportunities outside one's own county.

*"Devolution has encouraged more tribalism than bringing national cohesion, reason being, and that's now a campaign that is coming up, that you go to a county they want to employ everybody from that community...we have devolved to tribes. But if the counties would be free that somebody could get employed in a county that is not where his tribe belongs, then it would encourage national cohesion."*  
(Two participant discussion)

*"So there's still that feeling – this county, our schools, we don't need foreigners to come from another county..."* (Interviewee, Nairobi)

Despite the TSC policy that teachers can be deployed anywhere in the country, such attitudes affect the



education sector too. Contracts are expected to go to locals and there are cases of hostility towards head teachers who do not come from the community. This ethos worsens the situation in the sense that teachers feel that they do not belong outside their home county, and are even afraid of taking up posts as a result of tribal animosity. All these factors serve to potentially weaken and undermine national unity and social cohesion in the education system, with potentially deleterious effects on broader conflict dynamics.

### 8.4 Limitations of peace education policy

For at least a decade, diverse stakeholders have recognized the linkages between education and peacebuilding policies in Kenya. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, which followed the 2007 post-election violence, recognized education's role in addressing youth unemployment and acknowledged civic education and the school curriculum as means of consolidating national cohesion. The report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Committee (TJRC, 2013) recommended that the education concerns of minority groups and indigenous people, including Muslim communities, should be addressed and that education be included in strategies for economic development of marginalized regions. Education is also among the key functions of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission in Kenya, whose mandate involves promoting equality, harmony, good relations and peace among Kenya's diverse population. Additionally, mainstreaming peace education is seen as a means to enhancing conflict management and non-violent dispute resolution (MoJNCCA, 2012).

Government commitment to promoting peace through education is evidenced by the introduction of a Peace Education Programme (PEP), ongoing since 2008, and the Education Sector Policy on Peace Education, published in 2014. These programs and policies demonstrate an awareness of the role of education in peacebuilding and signal a desire on the part of the government and society to promote peace and reconciliation. However, the following sections illustrate how the impact of peace education in Kenya has been limited by weaknesses in the linkage between curriculum, education management and governance.

#### ***Insufficient teacher capacity-development***

In addition to the development of materials on peace education, teachers were trained through a cascading approach. Regions most affected by the post-election violence were targeted first and other regions later, although financial constraints have meant that not all regions have been reached (stakeholder interview). Although the Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development is mandated to train teachers in line with curriculum revisions, only some have been oriented to the 2008 revision in life skills education (Njeng'ere, 2014, p. 9). Moreover, Teacher Training Colleges (training primary teachers) and universities (training secondary teachers) have yet to develop a life skills program for pre-service teacher training (stakeholder interview). Until such pre-service integration takes place and adequate in-service training is provided, it is unlikely that the curriculum will meet its full potential to nurture peace. Furthermore, it has been observed that school leadership is an important factor in the success of the PEP. Thus, follow-ups through head teacher training and monitoring for instance, as well as taking diverse local contexts into account in developing teacher training, may be crucial to effective long-term implementation (Lauritzen, 2016).

#### ***Implementation and sustainability challenges***

*"There are plenty of policies in Kenya, we are very good policy-makers. Rwanda borrowed from us, Mauritius borrowed from us, so we have policies. The problem is implementation and enforcing the policies, that's where we get it all wrong. So once again it goes back to what you say, governance is weak." (Interviewee, Nairobi)*

Peace education is integrated into the curriculum through formal subjects such as life skills, religious studies, social studies, history and government. According to interviewees integration of peace education is not sufficient in practice. One issue is that peace education, not a stand-alone subject, is subsumed into other subjects. Moreover, where these subjects are not examinable, they are neglected (life skills), and where examinable (social studies) they are taught to test rather than with a focus on imparting the skills and values peace education sets out to inculcate. A key constraint is that teachers are evaluated on the grades achieved by their pupils. In this regard, the government's move to abolish ranking of schools may be a step in the right direction.

Even trained teachers can be slow to move away from traditional methods of pedagogy towards the activities-based approach advocated for in peace education. Peace education has been differentially embraced by teachers, with some evidence suggesting that teachers in areas affected by conflict are more likely to realize its relevance (stakeholder interview). This relates to a further weakness of peace education. As a result of focusing primarily on conflict-affected districts, there is evidence that it has been perceived as an emergency response relevant only to these areas, rather than a preventative action relevant for all schools in the country. Examining challenges to the implementation of peace education following the Kenyan post-election violence, Lauritzen describes how the PEP was initially a 'reactive program'. That is, it came about as an emergency response to the violence. The design of the program – focused on mitigating violence and healing trauma, and its implementation – primarily targeting teachers in the most-affected regions, reinforced the perception of peace education as an emergency response (Lauritzen, 2016). As a result, it has been difficult to move to a more 'sustainable proactive' peace education (ibid).

### ***Emphasis on intergroup relations over systemic and structural injustices***

In three out of four of Lauritzen's case study schools, peace was found to be perceived in terms of 'negative peace' or absence of violence. In the one school where peace education was perceived as most relevant, peace was perceived as 'positive peace', also recognizing the importance of addressing structural violence and "building relationships based on equality between ethnicities rather than merely focusing on direct violence" (Lauritzen, 2016). This suggests the conceptualization of peace is critical to ensuring that teachers and head teachers see the relevance and take responsibility for long-term implementation of the peace education program.

More generally, the perception of peace education as a response to political violence has resulted in a focus on intergroup relations and teaching conflict resolution and appreciation of diversity with little emphasis on systemic and structural injustices such as inequities, marginalization and discrimination. From a social cohesion perspective, education has the potential to contribute towards national unity and promote values that support peacebuilding. However, national civic education may take many forms and its contribution to peacebuilding may depend on whether it promotes uncritical patriotism, ethnic nationalism or inclusive citizenship based on common rights and responsibilities.

The 2014 Education Sector Policy on Peace Education puts across an understanding of education for peace among Kenyan policymakers that goes beyond the inclusion of peace education in the curriculum. The importance of taking a more systemic approach is acknowledged. The imperative task may be to imbed this perspective within the education system and to ensure implementation of these policies through institutional commitment and developing capacity over a sustained period.

## Chapter Summary

This chapter has illustrated how important interviewees perceive the role of the educational mobility of students and teachers across regional, ethnic and religious divides in achieving integration and national unity. Progress and challenges to successful integration through education have also been highlighted. While the provincial and district school quota policy of the 1980s stemmed integration, the current expansion of national schools is a positive move. Nevertheless, as in the case for teachers, student movement has been curtailed by security concerns and feelings of not belonging outside one's home county or region, irrespective of deployment and quota policies, especially since the 2007 election violence. These issues are harder for governance actors to address, but demonstrate the urgency needed to bridge ethnic and regional divides. Further, it is not only internal, ethnicity-based and political conflicts, but increasingly, cross-border violence that threatens security in Kenya. The latter is reinforcing marginalization, particularly in the so called 'hardship' areas of north-east and coastal Kenya. Local, trained teachers are scarce in these areas, and 'foreign' teachers are afraid to take up posts, so students face a deepened education disadvantage.

In order to promote equity and peace, it is crucial that the education system recognizes the diverse cultural, economic and environmental needs of children and youths. Democratic learning environments are also important in terms of promoting trust and tolerance. Conversely, interviewees pointed out that school environments, as well as student-teacher relations, can reproduce a culture of violence and corruption, with

implications for peace in the wider society. To promote peace, management and governance structures, which ensure that students are not subjected to discrimination, excessive punishments or unwarranted discipline from an early age, are important.

The link between internal tensions stemming from historical and ongoing marginalization and deep-rooted ethnic divisions, and the expansion of violent groups such as Al-Shabaab into Kenya has also been discussed. Government and security responses, which are perceived to victimize already-marginalized groups including refugees and Somali Muslims through 'collective punishment', have been highly criticized. Rather than stemming radicalization, such strategies may advance the aims of violent groups by fueling resentment and grievances towards the government as well as ethnic and religious 'others'. On the other hand, well-governed interventions that address the issues of high youth unemployment and disaffection along ethnic and religious lines may present an alternative strategy to dealing with the issue of youth recruitment to both internal political conflicts and by groups using violence. Education has a role to play in this. To do so, education management and governance must be strengthened so as to address the challenges to effective integration of students from all religious and ethnic backgrounds, especially alienated minorities. Furthermore, respondents in this study suggest that national and county government policies to address the gap between education and youth employment opportunities need to be urgently operationalized, and structures set in place to regulate against the common occurrences of nepotism and tribalism that hinder equal opportunities for employment. This would be instrumental in ensuring that education equips learners with relevant skills and knowledge.

Although it was hoped that devolution would address practices of exclusion and privilege in governance in the wake of the 2007 violence, it is not clear that it has been successful in promoting reconciliation so far. In fact, many interviewees believe that devolution has exacerbated tribalism to the detriment of social cohesion. A number of issues have arisen in the education sector during the first two years of devolved governance. Devolution is still young and it is taking time to foster a culture of cooperation and collaboration between education stakeholders, particularly the parallel governance structures of the new devolved county governments, the independent TSC, and MoEST which apply different forms of decentralization. For effective implementation of devolution, each stakeholder must find their footing in relation to the others and all stakeholders need a commonly agreed interpretation of the constitution, especially when it comes to issues of teacher employment. If each actor plays their role as set out in the constitution, and functions and resources are transferred accordingly, embracing devolution in the education sector need not be at odds with national unity, which may be the fear underpinning education management and governance approaches that have only de-concentrated education services to local levels. The potential of devolved governance to enhance community participation, strengthen checks and balances and meet county-specific infrastructural needs and vocational skills can be realized. At the same time, the centre is still responsible for ensuring the promotion of national unity and cohesion, such as encouraging the movement of students and teachers across counties in post-primary education. If handled well, devolution has the potential to address inequities and marginalization across regional and ethnic lines – considered a root cause of conflict in Kenya. However, care is needed to ensure the country does not become even more divided along tribal lines. To circumvent this, education has an important role to play in fostering national unity among Kenya's ethnically diverse population.

Without a doubt, MoEST, with support from donors and NGOs, has taken peace education in Kenya very seriously since 2008. However, the impact of peace education on reconciliation has been limited by weaknesses in the linkage between curriculum, management and governance. These weaknesses include insufficient investment in the capacity development of teachers to make it an effective policy; perceptions of peace education as an emergency response relevant only to conflict-affected areas; and an emphasis on promoting intergroup relations over addressing systemic and structural injustices.





## 9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

An education system that better promotes sustainable peace and development in Kenya should be grounded in national and local realities and capable of addressing both the drivers and legacies of conflict. This requires conflict-sensitive, evidence-based policy formation rooted in national and local policy dialogue. If it is to be successful, this requires important organizational changes and commitments from national and regional government actors and institutions, international donors, national and international NGO communities, and UN education actors. While the education system alone cannot resolve the drivers or legacies of conflict, it can play a much greater role in supporting vital peacebuilding processes in Kenya.

### 9.1 Linkages between education inequalities, governance and peacebuilding

Here, three very important conclusions are drawn from this research:

#### ***1. The relationship between education inequities and conflict***

While no direct causal relationship can be determined, the quantitative analysis demonstrated an association between poor educational indicators and the high occurrence of conflict across counties. That is, counties with relatively large inequities in educational access and resources have experienced the highest occurrence of conflict since 2007. In addition, both poor educational indicators and a high incidence of conflict align with high poverty rates, suggesting a relationship between development, educational inequities and vulnerability to conflict. Furthermore, counties which displayed the worst indicators of educational development (e.g. Mandera, Garissa) are among counties that have been most susceptible to conflict during the latest analysis period (since 2012). It has also been observed that marginalization of these north-eastern counties in terms of provision of education, has recently been exacerbated by external security threats. In some instances, educational institutions, students and staff have been directly affected by violence. In analyzing these conflict/education relationships, this study suggests that inequity in the education system is both a result of ongoing conflict in these regions, as well as a contributing factor driving conflict. This reflects a longer history of broader political economy dynamics that have driven conflict in these regions. It also highlights the importance of addressing the education system in terms of broader issues of peace and development, and the need to coordinate strategies with other sectors – with education management and governance improvements being part of a broader and holistic inter-sectoral approach to addressing regional inequality and marginalization.

#### ***2. How education governance contributes to reducing vulnerabilities to conflict***

One important approach to addressing the root causes of conflict in Kenya has been through devolution in line with the Constitution of Kenya 2010. The education sector has only been partially devolved, with the function of early childhood education and management of youth polytechnics now under county government control, and responsibility for primary and secondary-level education remaining with the national government. As a result of partial devolution in the sector, there are now parallel systems of governance at the county level. Although both governments and the TSC are supposed to consult and cooperate, a number of conflicts have arisen, particularly in relation to the employment and management of teachers. Notwithstanding concerns over the capacity of county governments to absorb development funds, devolution is already showing potential for bringing infrastructural development to the most marginalized. It is also clear that far-reaching and unbiased civic education is needed so that all stakeholders, including communities, can participate in governance and play an oversight role as anticipated in the constitution. Without fostering more representative governance, there is a risk that devolution may maintain rather than transform the status quo, reinforcing governance systems based on patronage and favoritism. Key findings in the report suggest that there is lack of community participation, lack of oversight and accountability, and insufficient

mechanisms in place to ensure that budgets are not lost to corruption.

### **3. The contribution of education to social cohesion and intergroup relations**

Kenyan peace education programs and policies demonstrate a desire on the part of the Kenyan government, broader society and donors to promote peace and reconciliation. They also indicate that efforts have been made to integrate education into peace, reconciliation and social cohesion policies. However, the important task may be to imbed this perspective within the education system and to ensure implementation of these policies through institutional commitment and developing capacity over a sustained period. Peace education that is perceived merely as a response to violence, and thus focuses on calming intergroup relations and psychosocial support rather than systemic and structural injustices such as inequities, marginalization and discrimination, may have limited long-term impact on peacebuilding. Furthermore, school environments and teaching practices can play a role in nurturing peace, or reproducing a culture of violence and corruption. It is therefore imperative that school management and governance mechanisms ensure that students are not subjected to discrimination, excessive punishments or unwarranted discipline from an early age.

It is difficult to be definitive about the role of education in addressing threats to national security posed by violent groups such as Al Shabaab, since many of the underlying causes lie beyond Kenya's borders and are linked to geopolitical factors. However, internal historical grievances along ethnic and religious lines, and perceived collective punishment of already-marginalized populations, including refugees, are thought to exacerbate these risks. Education that is better aligned to livelihoods and thus 'relevant' to local conditions may also be an important aspect of an alternative strategy to deal with youth recruitment into violence, while at the same time recognizing the cultural value of local systems.

## 7.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations highlight key issues for education policymakers to consider in their efforts to promote equity, social cohesion and sustainable peace and development in Kenya:

### **National education policymaking and curriculum development**

- Policymakers and curriculum developers should reconsider the relevance of the 8-4-4 system in meeting the economic and cultural needs of children and youths across diverse environments within Kenya. Education that is better aligned to livelihoods may be important in deterring youth recruitment into violence among marginalized populations.
- In order to reduce disparities in education provision between public and private primary schools, it is necessary to strengthen public sector monitoring and auditing mechanisms to ensure equitable and efficient use of limited financial and teaching resources.
- Minimizing disparities within the public secondary education sector and avoiding elite access to high-status, well-performing secondary schools, requires stronger enforcement mechanisms to ensure that government fee guidelines are respected and not undermined by private interests. More investment is needed in raising the standards of county and district secondary schools to a level comparable with national and extra-county schools.
- Affirmative action may be needed to supplement capitation funding for schools in sparsely-populated regions and regions with a high population of out-of-school children, so that investments can be made to improve facilities and infrastructure. Through prioritizing equity, education can be integrated into strategies to address historical grievances along ethnic and religious lines.
- Continue building on recent progress made in collecting reliable education data and developing an effective Education Management Information System. Publish EMIS microdata at school level for researchers and users to analyze.

### ***School level governance and local authorities***

- Address violence, excessive or unwarranted discipline and prejudicial treatment of students in schools. While policies on violence and corporal punishment in schools already exist, stronger monitoring and reporting mechanisms are needed, and measures should be taken to ensure implementation of discipline policies.
- Sensitize both local administrations and communities on the value of education, and hold them accountable for the implementation of government policies. This will help to address cultural barriers to education such as early marriage and child labor.
- Ensure that teachers and communities can contribute to education policymaking to meet the obligations for participation provided for in the constitution. Far-reaching and unbiased civic education can play an important role in promoting inclusive participation.

### ***County governments***

- It is important to ensure that capacity is developed in all counties so that each county can prioritize, budget, and use these resources effectively.
- Ensure that school governance committee nominations are inclusive and transparent to address perceptions of bias.
- Update and rebrand youth polytechnics to make them more attractive to students and parents.
- Teacher training and management
- One way to place greater emphasis on peace education in schools may be to sensitize teachers and communities on the importance and relevance of peace education for all communities so that it is not conceived as simply a response to conflict but rather, a preventative measure to promote non-violent conflict resolution skills and tolerance among learners. Therefore, peace education must be integrated into both pre-service and in-service training for all teachers for the long term.
- Support the improvement of transparent teacher performance and integrity appraisal.

Beyond the specific policy recommendations outlined above, this study also emphasizes that inequities perpetuated via education contribute to conflict, rather than that conflict merely interrupts education, as is often argued by the Education in Emergencies (EiE) discourse. Addressing inequalities and structural issues around the management of education service delivery can work on broader political economy factors in conflict settings that can contribute to conflict, and thus have an important preventative role. These inequalities take different forms, including the quality and relevance of education, which are often ignored by dominant global paradigms for inclusion and equity. Crucially, this study suggests that addressing inequalities and factors giving rise to conflict are rooted in development programming, rather than responsive emergency programming. This speaks to the importance of mainstreaming conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding approaches to the entire portfolio of education programming, rather than restricting peacebuilding and education work to emergency and post-conflict settings.





Photo: © UNICEF/Kenya2015/Children playing in Kakuma



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# ANNEX 1: NVIVO ANALYSIS

## Thematic nodes coded and organised in initial interview analysis

Thematic nodes coded and organised in initial interview analysis

Node Name	Sources	References
<b><i>Social cohesion and integration</i></b>	21	107
Peace in schools	19	72
Curriculum	17	32
Peace education	15	21
Civic education	4	6
Language of instruction	2	4
Democratic practice, environment in school	4	4
Focus on examinable subjects	2	4
violence in schools, corporal punishment	1	1
Cohesion, integration	9	13
Tribalism, clanism	8	11
Policy response	5	6
Ranking	5	6
Religion	3	3
Madrassa, Duksi	1	1
<b><i>Drivers of inequality, challenges and responses</i></b>	21	93
Regional, county disparities, inequalities	17	27
Secondary schools and transitioning	8	12
Policy efforts and suggestions	7	10
Ratios, quotas	6	7
Affirmative action	3	3
High fees, grade cut offs	4	9
Cultural barriers, attitudes	9	9
Private education	6	9
Gender	6	9
which sectors levels need most attention	8	8
<b><i>Governance actors</i></b>	23	92
National government, Ministry of Education	10	22
International actors	13	20
Bridge schools	3	5
DfID	2	2
UNICEF	1	1
Stakeholder voice	13	20
Boards of management, SMCs, PTAs Sensitisation of communities, stakeholders	8	10
NGOs, CSOs, CBOs	6	7
Bursary, CDF refs	3	4
Provincial admin	4	4
Police, security forces	3	3
Community needs	1	1
<b><i>Teacher nodes</i></b>	19	73
Teacher training	17	33
About TSC	7	12
Teacher pay, strike	7	7
Teacher deployment	6	6
University autonomy	5	6
Teacher absenteeism, supervision of teachers	4	4
Teacher discipline	3	3
About TePIK	1	2

<b>Governance issues</b>	16	63
Finance management	9	18
Corruption, political interference	10	15
policy implementation gap	9	14
Interpretation of policy, law	6	7
Clarity of roles of different actors	5	6
Political affiliation	3	3
<b>Education, conflict and peace</b>	21	47
Education and peace	15	17
Education and conflict	16	17
security	4	6
Terrorism, insecurity	3	4
Education in emergencies	1	2
Pyscho-social support	1	1
<b>Devolution, 2010 constitution</b>	13	20
Youths and continuing education	9	16
idleness, engage, job market, opportunities	5	8
Youths, youth polytechnics	4	6
Adult and continuing education	2	2
<b>IDPs and refugees</b>	2	2


Note: Child nodes are aggregated to parent nodes

## Number and type of interviewee included in initial interview analysis

Interviewee Type	Number of interviewees
National Government Official	4
TSC	3
Teacher Unions	2
County Government Official	2
Public Primary School Teacher	2
CDF Member	2
Bridge School	2
Public Primary School Headteacher	2
Extra-County Secondary School Teacher	1
Curriculum Development	1
Youth	1
County Education Board	1
National Secondary School Teacher	1
Private Primary School Headteacher	1




## ANNEX 2: STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN KENYA



Source: (Kenya Election Database, 2012; KNBS and SID, 2013, p. Annex 2.4; Republic of Kenya, 2011, p. 9)

\*Information added/updated based on reviewer comments.

## ANNEX 3: ODA TO KENYAN EDUCATION SECTOR 2005-2013 (US\$ MILLIONS)



Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, downloaded 23/10/2015. Note: Amounts represent gross disbursements in current prices.

## ANNEX 4: INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI COEFFICIENT) AND SCI ALL COUNTIES

County	Gini Index	Social Cohesion Index (sorted high to low)
Kiambu	0.335	65.9
Uasin Gishu	0.37	64.5
Nairobi	0.341	63.7
Siaya	0.405	63.2
Nyeri	0.365	62.9
Kisumu	0.43	62.7
Kericho	0.378	62.6
Kirinyaga	0.354	62
Kisii	0.42	61.6
Nyandarua	0.394	61.5
Mombasa	0.365	61.4
Murang'a	0.361	59.8
Kilifi	0.565	59.8
Lamu	0.471	58.7
Narok	0.315	58.4
Migori	0.464	58.1
Nyamira	0.394	57.9
Homa Bay	0.416	57.9
Embu	0.379	57.8
Nandi	0.343	57.6
Trans Nzoia	0.36	57.4
Isiolo	0.431	57.4
Tharaka-Nithi	0.398	57
Taita Taveta	0.437	56.8
Elgeyo Marakwet	0.358	56.5
Makueni	0.376	56
Laikipia	0.369	55.7
Samburu	0.332	55.6
Marsabit	0.365	55.1
Meru	0.348	54.8
Busia	0.459	54.1
Kakamega	0.394	53.8
Bungoma	0.43	53.5
Nakuru	0.376	53.4
Kwale	0.597	53.2
Bomet	0.338	53.1
Turkana	0.283	52.1
Vihiga	0.399	51.1
West Pokot	0.318	50.7
Kitui	0.388	50.6
Baringo	0.356	50
Kajiado	0.403	48

Machakos	0.403	46.6
Tana River	0.617	43
Mandera	0.332	38.8
Garissa	0.436	36.5
Wajir	0.321	22



# ANNEX 5: EDUCATION INDICATORS DISAGGREGATED BY COUNTY, 2014

COUNTY	Former Province	NER Secondary	GPI Secondary	Pupil-teacher ratio Secondary	Pupil-teacher ratio Primary	Repeaters Primary	KCPE Mean Skills*
Nairobi	Nairobi	25.3	0.84	17.09	28.69	0.77	53.24
Kiambu	Central	77.6	1.05	19.27	26.21	1.44	50.18
Kirinyaga	Central	90.1	1.19	20.03	26.09	3.56	54.03
Murang'a	Central	87.2	1.03	20.54	27.76	4.17	46.40
Nyandarua	Central	73	1.14	20.51	28.19	3.29	48.67
Nyeri	Central	86.1	1.05	20.00	22.94	3.53	49.35
Kilifi	Coast	26	0.88	19.48	36.31	5.31	46.87
Kwale	Coast	25.3	1.01	21.94	36.42	6.88	44.45
Lamu	Coast	42.7	0.67	18.31	24.72	4.43	43.91
Mombasa	Coast	27.9	0.78	17.29	26.48	1.23	53.70
Taita Taveta	Coast	63.8	1.02	19.69	26.61	3.91	44.17
Tana River	Coast	16.5	0.57	21.26	35.99	4.87	41.32
Embu	Eastern	73.4	1.01	17.84	23.25	5.11	48.01
Isiolo	Eastern	23.6	0.66	16.04	27.24	6.08	47.87
Kitui	Eastern	55.1	1.03	18.96	27.77	6.34	45.84
Machakos	Eastern	79.4	1.03	19.63	27.18	5.94	48.55
Makueni	Eastern	85.5	1.02	20.46	29.30	6.12	51.76
Marsabit	Eastern	12.9	0.65	16.09	36.27	7.34	49.15
Meru	Eastern	57.5	1.13	19.29	27.78	6.07	47.44
Tharaka-Nithi	Eastern	91.4	1.12	19.99	20.29	4.88	50.51
Garissa	North Eastern	12.3	0.41	19.09	47.65	1.31	54.17
Mandera	North Eastern	7.3	0.37	22.13	58.96	1.50	48.28
Wajir	North Eastern	9.3	0.38	20.18	45.36	1.48	50.34
Homa Bay	Nyanza	58.1	0.77	19.56	32.05	4.68	48.41
Kisii	Nyanza	81.5	0.90	20.44	28.11	2.76	45.68
Kisumu	Nyanza	58.1	1.01	19.12	32.15	5.40	50.10
Migori	Nyanza	46	0.81	21.02	36.51	4.62	47.35
Nyamira	Nyanza	71.4	1.05	19.40	26.24	2.36	46.23
Siaya	Nyanza	62.6	0.85	20.75	34.63	7.18	49.16
Baringo	Rift Valley	45.3	0.93	18.32	22.46	7.98	50.59
Bomet	Rift Valley	54.8	0.90	19.29	28.20	8.22	49.54
Elgeyo Marakwet	Rift Valley	61.5	1.09	19.11	25.26	6.77	51.39
Kajiado	Rift Valley	26.3	0.93	16.25	26.75	4.59	51.64
Kericho	Rift Valley	58.6	0.92	19.58	28.41	6.80	49.38

Laikipia	Rift Valley	61.5	1.01	19.49	28.29	3.16	47.84
Nakuru	Rift Valley	59.5	0.97	19.96	33.62	2.56	48.62
Nandi	Rift Valley	50.7	1.03	18.48	27.54	7.40	52.60
Narok	Rift Valley	19.9	0.71	20.91	35.94	7.31	47.50
Samburu	Rift Valley	15.4	0.60	15.50	39.03	6.47	49.90
Trans Nzoia	Rift Valley	42.3	0.91	20.78	38.96	5.86	49.52
Turkana	Rift Valley	8.7	0.49	28.48	71.38	4.77	47.88
Uasin Gishu	Rift Valley	38.2	1.08	18.27	28.05	5.52	52.86
West Pokot	Rift Valley	18.9	0.94	20.33	36.39	7.13	49.27
Bungoma	Western	54.1	0.86	21.81	43.01	5.64	48.78
Busia	Western	39.9	0.82	19.25	39.01	6.32	51.32
Kakamega	Western	52.1	0.97	19.51	38.40	7.44	50.62
Vihiga	Western	79.9	0.99	20.29	32.83	7.35	50.64

Source: MoEST 2015b

\*Means score across English and mathematics



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